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Book Reviews

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John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap.
By Christopher A. Preble (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), xi + 244 pp. \$32.00 cloth.

There are uncanny parallels between the presidencies of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and George W. Bush 40 years later, both of which emerged from questionable circumstances. There are the “gross exaggerations” of national peril by partisan pundits, the inflammatory testimonies of disaffected retired generals, the mad scientists, the well-heeled academic apologists, the in-house pollsters, the ambitious congressional toadies. During both presidencies defense contractors profited from orchestrated national panic to the detriment of doctrines of moderation, and with similar consequences: “prolonged” Cold War and “disastrous” third world interventions. Above all, both presidencies were driven by a Big Lie: in Kennedy’s case, the “missile gap.”

Just as the attack on 9/11 shocked Americans out of a sense of complacency, so did *Sputnik* and the Soviet ICBM tests. And just as the crumbling Twin Towers occasioned transference of America’s own complicity in international violence onto a fantasy of monstrous proportions—Islamo-fascism—so did the USSR’s early successes in rocketry. These events seemed to confirm that the world really was divided into polar opposites: us, reputed Champions of Liberty, and them, COMINTERN, the Evil Empire. More pointedly, just as exposure of the Big Lie has resulted in back-peddling by Bush’s handlers, so too with Kennedy’s “Whiz Kids.” “Visible irritation” was followed by denials that any such thing was said, then implied admissions that it had, and finally “quiet interment” of the phrase. This process is so common as to have the status of a universal commandment in politics: first try to muzzle internal dissent. If this fails then call for an investigation into “poor intelligence.” As a last resort, redefine the entire issue as an “intelligence gap.”

Christopher A. Preble shows how in free capitalist societies economic resources are channeled toward military ends during times of peace: not through central command, but by the competitive marketing of defense hardware to procurers and the proffering government contracts. The latter in turn drive the economies of the local communities represented by Congress which, naturally, votes for ever larger military outlays. The resulting tax burdens are legitimized with platitudes like “ask not what your country can do for you . . .” and “bear any burden.” In sum, says Preble, the military-industrial complex was not a conspiracy against the will of the people; “It *was* the will of the people.”

The balance of Preble’s book details Kennedy’s campaign speeches state-by-state and analyzes the TV debates with Richard Nixon. Here, oddly, the phrase “missile gap” was invoked only five times. Even the author admits that it “may not have been singularly significant” in the election outcome. Why, then, did Kennedy win? I still think it had to do with Nixon’s weasel-eyes and five o’clock shadow counter-posed to Kennedy’s urbane, square-jawed, lanky athleticism.

This easily read, well-documented study is recommended for all undergraduate libraries.

JAMES AHO
Idaho State University, USA

Benevolence and Betrayal: Five Italian Jewish Families under Fascism. By Alexander Stille (New York: Picador, 2003), 365 pp. \$15.00 paper.

Alexander Stille is an eclectic journalist, who specializes in Italian political culture and history. His book *Benevolence and Betrayal: Five Italian Jewish Families under Fascism* (first published in 1991) provides a fascinating introduction to the history of the Jews in Italy

under the Fascist regime and during the Second World War.

The book, divided into five chapters, narrates the stories of five families and offers the reader a complete picture of the situation and peculiarity of Italian Jewry.

The history of the Jews in Italy is quite complex. Until the unification of Italy (1861–70) and even after, historical events had a direct or indirect effect on the political status of the Jews, shaping their sociodemographic characteristics. The history of the Jews in Italy is closely related to that of their Gentile neighbors. This is why each of the five family histories is completely different from one another.

During Mussolini's first year in power, the position of the Jews remained ostensibly much as it had been before, and their place in Italian life was hardly affected. Until the Legislation Racial Law (1938), Italian Jews were completely integrated in the economic, political, and social life as were all other citizens in Italy.

This integration, Stille claims, was an exception when compared to other European countries, and explains why it was considered normal for many Jews to become Fascists, just as some were anti-Fascists or Socialists, like their Gentile neighbors:

the experience of Italian Jews was complex: a strange mixture of benevolence and betrayal, persecution and rescue (12).

In order to show this, the first chapter narrates the story of the Ovazza family of Turin. The Ovazzas were Fascists. The dominant figure of the family, Ettore, was the most Fascist of the clan, which continued to believe in Fascism and in Mussolini even after the Racial Laws and the deportation of the Italian Jews to the concentration camps.

The second chapter tells the story, still in the mid-1930s, of an opposite case, a family also from Turin: the Foás who were anti-Fascists. Unlike the Ovazzas, who were in Turin before the Jewish emancipation of 1848, the Foás settled in the city much later, around 1885. The Foás from the very beginning identified themselves with liberal democratic ideas against the Fascist regime, even if some family members were Fascists. But this was quite common in Jewish Italian families.

The third chapter is the story of the Di Verolis, one of the Jewish families that were deported by the Nazis from the ghetto of Rome on 16 October 1943.

The fourth story is set in Genoa, also in 1943. This chapter shows the cooperation between the local Catholic Church, which saved Jews by hiding them in convents, and the Genovese Jewish community. There are two families in this story: the family of Rabbi Riccardo Pacifici, which proves how, even in these dangerous years, some Italian Jews remained deeply attached to their religious traditions. The second family, or rather, the most important figure of the second family, Massimo Teglio, was a Jew married to a Catholic, who while working in a clandestine assistance organization, saved many Jews from deportation.

The last chapter is the story of the Schonheits from Ferrara, who were deported to a concentration camp on 15 November 1943.

Stille's book is unique. Like a puzzle, each story represents a different and contradictory aspect of the life of Italian Jews. Their Jewish history is not separated from Italian history. Furthermore, the structure and the content of the book, based not only on bibliographical documentation but on interviews, letters and diaries, contributes to its intimate style of presentation.

This book is more than a historical study, it is what we might call a book of "historical memories." Consequently, I highly recommend it to scholars and any person interested in understanding the uniqueness of Italian Jewry.

CRISTINA M. BETTIN

Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

Contemporary Japanese Thought. Edited by Richard F. Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), viii + 309 pp. \$64.50/£42.00 cloth; \$24.50/£16.00 paper.

Richard Calichman's anthology contains interesting contributions by Japanese intellectuals from various fields. Two authors deal with

Takeuchi Yoshimi's critique of Japanese modernization. Three discuss the meaning of the Japanese flag and anthem and reasons to use or not to use them. The feminists Ehara Yumiko and Ueno Chizuko examine the difficulties for Japanese women to question modernity (Ehara) and take Japan as a particular example of Orientalism in order to investigate how it is represented in the gendered language of orientalist discourse (Chizuko). Kang Sangjung writes about ethnic discrimination during Japan's colonial period, while Karatani Kôjin explains, within a new discussion of the "Overcoming Modernity" Symposium, the opposition between literature and philosophy. Naoki Sakai deals with texts by the Taiwanese writers Chin Kasen and Ô Shôyû and with a novel by John Okada, *No-No Boy*, about a Japanese-American draft register. Takahashi Tetsuya reflects about the possibility of democracy without nationalism.

More than giving us insights into various domains of Japanese intellectual life, the book invites us to consider "Japanese Thought." The apparently neutral word "thought" confronts us with a problem that the more traditional word "philosophy" successfully eludes. While Asian countries have produced something that can be called "philosophy," "thought" remains almost restricted to the Western hemisphere. Do we implicitly believe that Asian or African thinkers, when pondering their "local" problems, should use Western models of thought? Though the concept represents a challenge, it is difficult to spell out what "Japanese Thought" actually is. Is it "thought" that deals with Japan or a method based on Japanese culture that can subsequently be applied to anything? A Frenchman living in France would most probably use theories developed by his countrymen when writing about *any* subject. However, this is not the case for Japan. So, what is Japanese Thought?

Calichman is sensitive to some of these problems in his introduction. The question is if he really manages to establish something like "Japanese Thought." These are not texts that we all wanted to read but could not because there was no translation available. Most of the texts we did not even know about. This is a good thing. And we read them because we are interested in "Japanese Thought." However, can anybody be interested in

feminist theory, the Japanese occupation of Korea, the problem of death in the contemporary world, and Japanese emigration, all at once? Not all of the authors are Japanese (some are Korean), not all of them live in Japan. Some write in English, some in Japanese; one contribution (Nishitani Osamu's) does not even treat a Japan-related topic.

While there is probably no answer to the question "What is Japanese Thought?," Calichman courageously takes the risk of presenting intellectual Japan in a new way. His book is a powerful critique of notions of the Japanese people and Japanese language.

THORSTEN BOTZ
EHESS Paris

Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England. By David Colclough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xiv + 293 pp. \$75.00/£45.00 cloth.

The topic of David Colclough's book is important and is treated with discrimination and scholarship in a lucid and unpretentious style. The work is carefully circumscribed in that it does not cover satirical literature, as recently discussed by Andrew McRae in *Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and neither does it deal with censorship. Colclough also consciously adds to an imposing body of literature in his use of recent post-revisionist history, C. M. Curtis's seminal thesis, *Richard Pace on Pedagogy, Counsel and Satire* (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1996, which must surely be published in its own right); and, above all, in applying Quentin Skinner's arguments about liberty.

So much for general orientation. The focus is on debate about the rhetoric of frankness and flattery as much as open critical discourse itself. Chapter 1 examines the literature on rhetoric and eloquence insofar as it explores the necessity, limits and strategies, of open speech. Hence it deals with the authenticity of rhetoric as an activity with moral responsibilities, beyond which the liberties of the rhetorician's office become mere licence. Peter Mack has shown more

generally how an education in rhetoric informed argument across early modern England [*Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 2002)], and Colclough provides a detailed case study.

Chapter 2 explores religious discourse, most notably sermons, arguing that Biblical and Patristic topoi were used to supplement and merge with a distinctive civic humanist concern with open speech. There was a Christian obligation to speak freely and a clerical duty to admonish. But again how this was to be done was contentious. Indecorous discourse could be misguided and ineffective, so a sense of the audience and institutional context helped shape utterance. Chapter 3 turns to parliament as a principal site for freedom of speech, only the exercise of which, many held, could sustain the institution's value in the polity. The fourth chapter deals most valuably with manuscript culture, exhibiting a different sense of decorum and limit, which, Colclough suggests, was a means by which a civic culture could be brought into existence. A thread of continuity is provided by the problematics of counsel and together with John Guy's work (acknowledged) "Rhetoric of Counsel," in *Tudor Political Culture*, ed. D. Hoak (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Stephen Alford's (strangely absent) *The Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 1558–1569* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), Colclough provides one of the best examinations of counsel we have. Throughout, he shows just how easily appeals to liberty could be presented as duties, the denial of liberty redescribed as licence.

Whether it is necessary to regard this as a distinctly positive liberty is another matter, but Colclough seems willing to impose later concepts on his material. The positive liberty imputed to the early seventeenth century is tied to a distinctly public sphere and this echo of Habermasian model building is sometimes conflated with a civic sphere and with what people were putatively intending to promote (e.g. 112). Whether religious discourse complements or compromises an abstracted notion of the "civic" is consequently unclear. This artificiality cuts across the way in which words like *public* and *private* were used and requires us to take with a pinch of salt Colclough's claim to being guided by available

meanings. These conceptual incoherences and vagrant anachronisms mar but do not vitiate an accomplished study.

CONAL CONDREN

University of New South Wales, Australia

When the King Took Flight. By Timothy Tackett (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), xiv + 270 pp. \$15.95 paper.

This well-written and thoroughly researched work combines a narrative of Louis XVI's flight to Varennes on 21 June 1791, with an analysis of its impact on the French Revolution. In doing so, it follows a recent trend that includes studies by David Andrew and Michael Fitzsimmons in placing events, and therefore contingency and human agency, at the center of revolutionary historiography.

Timothy Tackett's book succeeds as a story thanks to the intrinsically fascinating subject matter, lively prose, and incisive sketches of the *dramatis personae*. Particularly engaging are the contextual chapters that accompany the narrative, which explain the royal family's attitude toward the Revolution and the decision to flee, the revolutionary tension in Paris, and the transformation of provincial France after 1789. A section on the latter clarifies the improbable scenario in which a tanner and grocer from Varennes informed the King, once his identity was exposed, that he must return to Paris. In this instance, Tackett chronicles the rapid changes that Varennes experienced with the calling of the Estates General and the establishment of revolutionary institutions such as the National Guard and a local Jacobin club. Faced with orders from the King to let him pass and subsequently by orders from the National Assembly to halt him, the people of Varennes immediately obeyed the Assembly, demonstrating dramatically how their identities had shifted from monarchical subjects to French citizens in two short years.

The book's larger historiographical question deals with the origins of the Reign of Terror. Tackett acknowledges the numerous factors, including war and factionalism, that contributed to the overthrow of the liberal revolution, but he insists that "a full

explanation of the origins of the Terror must also reflect on the impact of... the attempted flight of the reigning king" (2). For Tackett, decisions made and repressive actions taken after Varennes, while not the "cause" of the Terror, constitute a "prefiguration of both the psychology and the procedures of the Terror" (223). Although he risks treating 1791 as a dress rehearsal for 1793–94, Tackett nevertheless convincingly explains and sketches the "new trajectory" of French politics after Varennes, for the event made republicanism a viable political alternative while seemingly justifying the revolutionaries' obsession with conspiracy.

Not surprisingly, the royal family, and especially Louis XVI, looms large in Tackett's analysis. He insists that the king and queen (essentially an Austrian agent) "had self-consciously followed a policy of deceit" (182), since at least October 1789 with the aim of restoring royal authority and undoing revolutionary reforms. For a monarch who considered the idea of the Rights of Man "utterly insane," what was the likelihood of his reconciliation with the liberal revolution of 1789? Like Arno Meier's *The Furies*, the present work has the virtue of taking seriously the phenomenon of counterrevolution in its explanation of revolutionary terror. Perhaps revisionist historians are correct in suggesting that the Terror was implicit in the Revolution from the start, but Tackett's important book reminds us that it was not solely the result of the pathologies of revolutionary political culture.

ANTHONY CRUBAUGH
Illinois State University, USA

Freud's Free Clinics: Psychoanalysis and Social Justice, 1918–1938. By Elizabeth Ann Danto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), xi + 348 pp. \$29.50 cloth.

Freud's Free Clinics is a welcome reply to the charge that psychoanalysis is both elitist and indifferent to social issues. One can only wonder why it has taken so long for this story to be told in a book-length study. Two months before the 1918 Armistice, Freud announced that "the conscience of society will awake." He added: "the poor man should have just

as much right to assistance for his mind as he now has to the life-saving help offered by surgery." Within a few years, several groups of European analysts had found ways to reach out to the disadvantaged by offering either free or reduced fee treatment. The famous Berlin *Poliklinik* opened in 1920, Schloss Tegel and the Viennese Ambulatorium in 1922, a London clinic in 1926, and another in Budapest in 1929. Elizabeth Danto's study tells the story of these clinics as they opened and then closed in the tumultuous years between the two world wars.

Title and subtitle are misleading. Freud played only a minor part in this story and this is not really a study of psychoanalysis and social justice. The structure is pedestrian (year by year) and the writing plods. Too little attention is paid to historical and social conditions. We are introduced to "Red Vienna" without any overview of the left-inspired initiatives in social and cultural issues that Austria pioneered between 1918 and 1939 and, later in the study, analysts are escaping from Germany before any mention of the rise of Nazism.

Even so, this is a major contribution to current understanding of two crucial decades in the history of psychoanalysis. It is a meticulously researched and impressively well-informed account of the changes as they unfolded, with thumbnail sketches of a great many of the personalities involved in the free clinic experience in Red Vienna and Weimar Berlin. The main movers in the initiative to establish free clinics were the second generation of psychoanalysts, including Marxists and Communists like Otto Fenichel, Wilhelm Reich, and Edith Jacobson, Socialists like Ernst Simmel and Siegfried Bernfeld, and Social Democrats like Eduard Hitschmann and Karen Horney. Max Eitingon's part in the success of the Berlin *Poliklinik* also deserves much wider recognition. The heady mix of left-wing politics and psychoanalysis fostered a number of initiatives that were to produce a lasting legacy. These include developments not only in psychoanalytic theory (Adler, Reich, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein) but also the principle of free treatment, the analysis of children and the treatment of adolescent problems. These were milestone achievements: they laid the foundations for current practice in both psychoanalysis and the social services.

This is an important book and can be strongly recommended to anyone interested in the history of either the psychoanalytic movement or the social services. It provides an enormous amount of new information, but it lacks a guiding argument. One can only hope that others will pick up the baton and take the story of psychoanalysis and social justice further.

TERENCE DAWSON
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European Political Economy: Political Science Perspectives. By Leila Simona Talani (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), xii + 235 pp. £49.95 cloth.

The concept of European Political Economy is at present rather obscure, raising the (almost) permanent problem of scientific terminology: is *economy* and *economics* one and the same thing? Is it a doctrinal and/or ideological problem? If so, how much science do we have in this debate? The first part of *European Political Economy* discusses “Theoretical Concerns” (80 pages—almost half of the work). The focus of future theoretical studies will probably change from the nation state (the economic and political analysis of which is called “political economy”) to the regional state (the economic and political analysis of which is called after the continent/region, in our case, the “European Political Economy”). More than that, the next step may be a significant change of emphasis from Regional Political Economy to Global Political Economy. The names of schools and the nuances that differentiate them are a source of possible confusion or at least a starting point of a doctrinal debate.

European Political Economy is useful for its preoccupation with clear definitions of the principal schools of thought that coexist at the global level. The theoretical framework presents the mainstream (orthodox) approaches and critical (heterodox) approaches to European Political Economy. But the book focuses mainly on the practical aspects of the European integration mechanisms, processes and institutions. The theoretical debate on “what is political economy” or which are the

newest positions in this respect (neo-realists, neo-Gramscians, neo-constructivists, neo-institutionalists, neo-functionalists, neo-intergovernmentalists) lays the ground for the final debate on Globalization, Regionalization and Nation State, from the perspective of the three principal schools of thought: intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and transnationalism.

A word on *economy*: Susan Strange’s explanation of the Greek word *oikonomia* is helpful here, but the explanation of “political economy” could have been complemented by noting that, in his apocryphal work *Economics*, Aristotle used the term “political economy” for the first time to refer to the third part of the economic sphere, apart from individual economy (the household) and the king’s economy (the royal domains). Thus, political economy comprised the “public goods” (terrains, roads, etc. for the common use of the citizens) and was used by Aristotle to refer to the *real* economy rather than to a theory about it.

The theoretical debate also ignores the Radical school (even though it is an American product) of *political economics*, which denomination is, I think, the best for the theoretical approach, whereas *political economy* is an apt name for the real public economic life as depicted by Aristotle. Of course, *economics* is the most general and comprehensive term that includes all theories about individual economic development. I therefore propose three denominations for the three levels of the study: (1) *economics*—the study of the microeconomic level (households, firms but also states or TNCs when acting as individual actors); (2) *political economics*—the study of the macroeconomic level (nation-state economy as an aggregate of individual actors in a specific legal framework); and (3) *global economics*—the study of the mondoeconomic (world) level (i.e. global financial flaws, global institutions and global agreements on commerce or environment). This reclassification could be useful in creating a global project for common denominations, definitions and contents, in which representatives from all schools of thought would participate. [In this project, “ends” and “means” would be used to define all fundamental concepts of economics and political science. My End–Means Methodology (EMMY) could be a starting point.] The very

interesting discussions of the two general approaches to political economy (mainstream and critical) raise the question if there is a uniquely European Political Economy. Of course, this should have a unitary vision and common conceptual and methodological tools. The debate on visions of and approaches to (political) economy/economics is necessary and useful.

The second part of the book treats practical aspects of European integration. The first step in the building of a future European federal state is the question of monetary integration. The common currency demonstrated that money is a social convention and not a mythical or esoteric question (chapter 4, by Leila Simona Talani). For sure, banking, as well as financial and fiscal integration need to be solved as the next step. Chapter 5 is devoted to banking (ECB) and chapter 7 to the social dimension (fiscal policy included). The problem of labour (intimately connected to the social issues) is analyzed in chapter 8, "Globalisation and Illegal Migration: A Political Economy Analysis of Migratory Flows from MENA Area to the European Union." In the final chapter, "Globalisation, Regionalisation and Nation State: Intergovernmentalism, Institutionalism and Transnationalism Confronted," the authors adopt a neutral, scientific attitude, "leaving to willing researchers the fascinating task to try and discover where the global shift is leading us all" (217). This is commendable as it encourages students and researchers to examine and classify political actions and social realities.

European Political Economy is a very interesting and well documented book: it is a good example of a relativistic and nondogmatic approach to the European integration process with all its ups and downs.

LIVIU DRUGUS

George Bacovia University, Romania

Life after Theory. Edited by Michael Payne and John Schad (London: Continuum, 2003), xi + 196 pp. £9.99 paper.

Life after Theory is made up of interviews and conversations with four leading academics who have left their mark on the loose baggy

monster known as Theory (an umbrella term covering a number of "poststructuralist" theories like Lacanian psychoanalysis, Kristevan feminism, Althusserian Marxism, Derridean Deconstruction, and the Foucauldian version of cultural history). In their brief preface, the editors outline the meteoric rise and fall of "Theory" from its beginning in Paris in the late 1960s to its peak in Yale in the 1970s and 1980s and its decline in the 1990s. (Interestingly, this decline seems to have gone hand in hand with the canonization and incorporation of Theory into the mainstream of academic syllabi throughout the Western world.) The volume is an attempt to address this phase of decline through conversations with Jacques Derrida, Frank Kermode, Christopher Norris, and Toril Moi.

All four interviewees seem to recognize the need for rethinking, and share the sense that something has gone wrong, or simply too far, along the way, although there is naturally no consensus on just what it is which needs to be rethought. The conversation with Derrida follows a lecture entitled "Perjuries," given on the same day at Loughborough University (but, unfortunately, not included in the volume). In a particularly moving passage, Derrida goes back to *The Post Card*, saying, "I confess that everything I oppose, so to speak, in my texts, everything that I deconstruct—presence, voice, living...—is exactly what I'm after in life. I love the voice, I love presence, I love... So I'm constantly denying so to speak, in my life what I'm saying in my books or my teaching" (8). The entire pathos and grandeur of Derrida's work, as well as the difficulty of teaching or learning deconstruction, seem to be encapsulated here.

Frank Kermode, whose very long engagement with the "institutions which shelter speculation, literary or theoretical" (57) has done nothing to blunt his love of literature and his insistence on questions of value, does not lament the demise of Theory, whose expansionist tendencies, he argues, took over the study of literature and resulted in the loss of the intimate contact with literary texts, in the devaluation of the aesthetic, and indirectly in the impoverishment of academia, which is now "a very large, though impotent, institution" (66).

Christopher Norris, now a professor of Philosophy, has recently embarked on the

project of “reclaiming the truth” against the corrosive effects of the radically constructivist, anti-realist view which is often identified with poststructuralist theories. Referring to the famous Sokal hoax and its institutional implications as a turning point, Norris insists on the need to retain the Kantian *sensus communis*, a rational public sphere and a sense of shared humanity across various cultural, ideological or religious differences.

Toril Moi, author of the landmark study of feminist theory, *Sexual/Textual Politics* (1985), is still looking for a way out of the impasse of constructivist vs. essentialist conceptions of the subject, for a new conception which would retain the lessons of Poststructuralism (i.e. the decenteredness of the subject) without giving up subjective agency and responsibility. For Moi, who has not given up her commitment to feminism, the disillusionment with Theory is due primarily to the fact that it has not made a real difference in the real world: it has not given women “access to the universal,” greater participation, or equality in institutional life.

In spite of the rather too-cute title of the volume (which sounds suspiciously similar to the kind of rhetoric diagnosed by the editors as nearly extinct), the end-product is, happily, very remote from it. The pleasure of reading this book derives not only from the candor of the interviewees and their readiness to rethink the implications of their own work and the general trends in which they have had leading roles. It is also due, at least in the case of the present reader, to their genuine and evident attempt to counteract the alienating rhetorical effects which have become the hallmark of Theory—to break away from suicidal self-enclosure within the confines of exclusive discourse by communicating and sharing their doubts and concerns in lucid, intelligible, and intelligent prose.

DAPHNA ERDINAST-VULCAN
The University of Haifa, Israel

Rethinking Literary History. Edited by Linda Hutcheon and Mario J. Valdes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), xiii + 214 pp. £25.00 cloth.

Rethinking Literary History is a joint project of five leading scholars, practicing literary

historians and literary theorists, engaged in the philosophical and methodological issues of literary historiography in the wake of poststructuralist and postcolonial theory. The timeliness of this project will be manifest not only to readers involved in the academic teaching of literature or in curriculum design, but to anyone who is aware of and concerned about the current crisis of the humanities in Western universities. The scholars who have collaborated in this project explore the underlying ideological assumptions of various models of literary history, address questions of identity politics, cultural memory and ideological critique in the shadow of globalization, and debate alternative conceptualizations of literary history for a postmodern, postcolonial world.

The issues which emerge from their essays developed from a more extensive collaborative project: two experiments in comparative literary history which began in 1996 at the University of Toronto—*The Oxford Comparative History of Latin American Literary Cultures* and the *Comparative History of East-Central European Literary Cultures—Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, in which the editors and authors of the present volume were involved, and a discussion forum organized at the MLA convention in 1997. It seems to me that these two factors—the duration of the project and its pragmatic development—have turned this volume into a genuine on-going conversation among the authors, which is evident not only in their references to each other’s work, but also in a less tangible but very real sense of responsibility to a larger community, which emerges from this collection.

It is impossible to do justice to specific contributions in the space of a brief review, but the most cursory glance at their spheres of engagement brings home the depth and breadth of this project. Linda Hutcheon’s essay addresses the persistence of the teleological model of comparative literature, which seems to have survived the ostensible demise of nationalistic or Eurocentric premises. In a lengthy and meticulously researched discussion, Hutcheon accounts for this persistence through alternative identity-politics perspectives, which have adopted this model for their own interventionist needs. Stephen Greenblatt’s response to Hutcheon’s essay presents the flipside of the same phenomenon and its

attendant ideological implications. In the third chapter, Mario J. Valdez deals with literary history and its role in the formation of cultural identity as a subspecies of general historiography. In the fourth chapter, in an original and often moving essay, Marshall Brown conceptualizes the project of literary history in terms of music, engaging in a dialogue with Foucault and the notion of counter-history; and the fifth essay, by Walter D. Mignolo, discusses the two experimental projects of comparative literary history from the perspective of the "colonial difference." The volume concludes with Homi Bhabha's brief and intensely personal response to some of the issues raised by these authors.

The one notable, inexplicable and, to my mind, regrettable exclusion in a volume so dense with references to all the seminal sources on this subject is that of Hans Robert Jauss, whose contribution to the conceptualization of literary history cannot be discounted, particularly in the context of Valdes's essay. Apart from this omission, however, the volume offers a panoramic and comprehensive picture of current perspectives, in addition to the original contributions offered by its authors.

Most importantly, the volume serves as a reminder of the profound cultural significance of literature and its formative role in relation to cultural identity, cohesion, and ethics. Against the leveling, techno-economic pressures of our globalized world and the embattled position of the humanities in general and literature in particular, this is a valuable reminder and perhaps the first step towards their re-empowerment.

DAPHNA ERDINAST-VULCAN
The University of Haifa, Israel

The Innovations of Idealism. By Rüdiger Bubner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), x + 274 pp. £40.00/\$55.00 cloth.

The collection of Rüdiger Bubner's essays, first published in German in 1995, reveals the significance of the legacy of German Idealist thinkers—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—for the development of contemporary hermeneutics. The major issues raised by their doctrines are considered relevant to the current philosophical situation in shedding a fresh light on

eternal problems. Bubner interprets the innovations of the main protagonists of German Idealism as the outcome of their prolific dialogues with Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Goethe. These dialogical adventures of ideas are an open process in which a final solution of the issues discussed is neither possible nor desirable. Bubner brilliantly combines a profound scholarly analysis of his philosophical sources with a perspectivist hermeneutical approach, using the strategies produced by thinkers of the past for understanding contemporary philosophical problems. The composition of the book, subdivided into three parts—"System," "History," and "Aesthetics"—allows him to cover the whole spectrum of the problems discussed by German Idealist thinkers.

Analyzing different approaches to building a systematic philosophical knowledge of German Idealism, Bubner uncovers the influence of Plato and Aristotle on its leading representatives. It is well known that the Kantian interpretation of the role of ideas in transcendental dialectic, as well as the Hegelian theory, owe much to Plato's absolute idealism. The author rightly believes that Schelling's discovery of Plato, which led to further development of his philosophical system, is not sufficiently studied and deserves greater attention. He persuasively proves that the productive synthesis of Plato with Kant's Third Critique was the origin of Schelling's philosophy of nature and systematic philosophy of identity (23). Irrespective of their differences, Aristotle's and Schelling's approaches to the question of God are similar in their attempt to find the ultimate ground of the universe in opposition to Hegelian mastering of the enigma through the concept. Bubner concludes that Schelling's understanding of Being, given to us in an "ultimately inexplicable fashion," has a definite affinity with Heidegger's treatment of this problem during the middle period of his thought (57). He also rightly argues that Schlegel's romantic project to introduce the idea of philosophy as an all-embracing work of art, and Schleiermacher's hermeneutical platform, were nourished by Plato's dialogical thought, demonstrating its vitality and significance for the contemporary world.

The often widespread interpretation of Hegel's heritage in terms of the opposition of his "progressive" dialectical method and his

“conservative” system of philosophy is correctly criticized as leading to the misinterpretation of the main unit of his thought—the *Science of Logic*. In opposition to Marx and Frankfurt School neo-Marxists, Bubner interprets Hegel’s *Logic* as a reconstruction or sublation of the history of metaphysics after Kant proclaimed its death. Comparing Hegel and Heidegger, Bubner suggests a certain similarity in their views: “In terms of conceptualising the internal tension between ‘history’ and ‘metaphysics’, Hegel and Heidegger actually stand much closer to one another than the latter is willing to admit” (65). Understanding Hegel’s *Logic* in terms of language philosophy is also quite untraditional. However, the purely methodological reading of Hegel as sublating the history of metaphysics in his *Science of Logic* does not answer why the self-constructing path of philosophy leads to a monologue of the absolute spirit as the constitutive principle of nature and history. Thus, one is still left with the suspicion that the contradictory tension between sublation and completion, reconstructive and speculative moments are the coexisting elements of Hegelian thought. Positively evaluating Hegelian “political anthropology,” his understanding of the social and political reality portrayed in his system, Bubner himself acknowledges this inner and unsurpassable tension between metaphysics and history that inspired Dilthey in his refutation of the universal necessity of the progressive spirit’s self-development in cultural life (85).

History, as Bubner rightly remarks, presents a very serious problem for German Idealists trying to grasp its meaning on a transcendental basis. Emphasizing the duality of nature and freedom, and the uniqueness of historical events, Kant believed it possible to find a certain idea of universal perfection of human capacities from the perspective of the species. Fichte and Schelling, each in his own manner, interpreted history from the point of view of the reflective activity of the human spirit, interconnecting past and present unique events on the way to its self-awareness. The contradictory unity between the reconstructive activity of the spirit casting a glance on the past and its result constitutes the core element of the Hegelian vision of history coined already in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where “the creation of genuine unity and the

negation of understanding’s finite forms of thought, represent the process by which reflection is carried over into speculation” (134–35). In Bubner’s view, the “genealogical reconstruction” of history in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* should be considered as having vital importance and fascination for contemporary philosophical thought (126). He argues that the Hegelian approach to history proved its validity in its critique of the Enlightenment, which was far more persuasive than that proposed by Rousseau. Despite the contradiction between Hegel’s speculative philosophy of history and his never fulfilled promise to write a “philosophical history,” Bubner believes that the genealogical perspective developed in German thinkers’ doctrines should teach us how to interpret history as an open process: “History is always the entirety of history considered in explicit relation to that site, within history itself, where we thematise and represent it to ourselves. This enterprise can certainly come to an end in the sense that it generates a seamless unification of the universal and concrete actuality. But that is also precisely the hour that calls for renewal of the same task. The owl of Minerva begins her fight only with the falling of the dusk. But every evening heralds a new day” (181). This is the lesson of the hermeneutical tradition from Dilthey through to Gadamer.

Turning to the aesthetic dimension of German Idealism, Bubner concentrates on the relations between post-Kantian thought and the romantic stance of philosophizing. He traces the history of Schlegel’s understanding of the task of philosophy to his polemical reading of Fichte’s *Doctrine of Science*. The aesthetic experience and the practice of literary criticism were the source of the romantic interest in the fragment, leaving things open to further comprehension and interpretation. Against the widely accepted view, in Bubner’s opinion, romantic irony stood in a clear opposition to the Fichtean desire to ground all forms of knowledge in terms of a self-positing ego (206). It contained in itself the dialectical impulse of surpassing of the limits of understanding on the way to the infinitely distant “whole.” Thus, Schlegel “clearly anticipates the entire theory of the deconstructive school from Derrida through to de Man” (199). In his evaluation of Kant’s interpretation of the nature of

aesthetic experience and the faculty of judgment as opening new promising horizons, Bubner correctly concludes that Hegel replaces aesthetic experience with the idea of the sensuous incarnation of the spirit in art history. In understanding art, the speculative element of Hegel's thought obviously triumphs over the historical: both art and religion are considered as requiring final overcoming and sublation in and through philosophy. Finding this approach totally unacceptable, Bubner supports another view of art, that proposed by Schlegel and Goethe: "This task envisages the unification of art and life, the intensification of social existence through the exercise of reflection, and a corresponding expansion of the horizons of humanity through the interventions of the critic" (200). To share this project means to accept the hermeneutical perspective needed for today.

Reading the texts of the leading representatives of German Idealism, Bubner reveals the aspects of their heritage that opened new horizons for contemporary hermeneutical thought. He successfully proves that by interpreting this important European philosophical tradition we can work out new strategies for understanding different dimensions of contemporary life.

BORIS GUBMAN

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Enlightenment Phantasies: Cultural Identity in France and Germany, 1750–1914. By Harold Mah (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), x + 227 pp. \$39.95/£22.95 cloth; \$19.95/£11.50 paper.

The cultural identities of Germany and France were shaped, in Harold Mah's judgment, by deeply complex responses to fundamental Enlightenment principles about language and identity, the classical tradition, and social civility. And although it has been commonplace to assign stable, almost stereotypical identities to the two nations—France as civilized, refined, but somewhat shallow; Germany as natural, Romantic, and rather brutish—Mah demonstrates that these national identities were neither internally coherent nor constant and uncontested. He contends,

moreover, that "terms of identity are in some ways idealized phantasies" and that it is the "multiple, contradictory, and phantasmatic nature of the terms and discourses of Enlightenment identities, how they interacted in France and Germany, and how they affected nineteenth-century projections of identity" that structure his analysis (12).

Mah substantiates his argument through several case studies. If, as scholars have often argued, the Enlightenment posited a universal cosmopolitanism, of which France was taken to be the exemplar and Germany its particularist, nationalist opposite, Mah complicates this picture by showing how Herder, best known as the father of German cultural nationalism and the defender of linguistic distinctiveness, was also drawn to the sophisticated salon culture of mid-eighteenth century France and frustrated by his inability to converse in French. Advocates of classicism, found on both sides of the Rhine, were far from finding a universal identity in the ancient past. Some extracted from ancient culture a model of stoic resolution (and, not incidentally, a rationale for confining women to the margins of society); others discerned an aesthetic of intriguing but also disturbing sensuality.

This is a deeply thoughtful, elegantly written work of scholarly reflection and interpretation. Its subtitle notwithstanding, however, it is not a comprehensive analysis of cultural identity in both France and Germany from the Enlightenment to the outbreak of the First World War. Germany receives more attention than France, suggesting if only indirectly that the Enlightenment shaped German cultural identity in more complex and long-lasting ways than was true of France. By restricting his analysis of cultural identity in France to the period from Diderot to Mme de Staël, Mah foregoes the opportunity to examine how classicism, rationalism, and civic virtue continued to influence cultural debate in France throughout the nineteenth century and, indeed, up to and beyond 1914. Had he broadened the chronological sweep of his analysis of French cultural identity his study would no doubt have unearthed ways in which classicism, rationalism, and France's putative cultural superiority informed cultural debate long after Mme de Staël put pen to paper. Furthermore, it would have become evident that just as French Enlightenment ideals

influenced—positively and negatively—German definitions of what civilization should (or could) be, German Enlightenment ideas, particularly those based on Kantian ethics, mattered enormously to French advocates of intellectual modernity. For many French intellectuals, neo-Kantianism constituted an antidote to classicist ideals identified by the end of the nineteenth century not with the Enlightenment but with a retrograde and nostalgic longing for the heyday of French monarchism. Enlightenment ideas infused cultural identity in France and Germany in the ways in which Mah so creatively suggests, and in many other ways as well.

MARTHA HANNA

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Hitler and the Germans. By Eric Voegelin (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2003), viii + 285 pp. \$19.95 paper.

This re-issuing of Eric Voegelin's lectures on Nazism (given in Munich in 1964) is necessary in light of current revisionist attempts to rationalize the complicity of the German people with the Hitler regime. Less than 20 years after the collapse of the Third Reich, Voegelin (a victim of Nazism himself) was troubled by the bad faith which academics and politicians inside (and sometimes outside) Germany were mustering to explain away the appeal of Hitler to millions of Germans. In these lectures, Voegelin shows no tolerance for excuses, particularly the rationalization that Hitler's personality possessed a "demonic aura" which overpowered otherwise rational persons. Against Hannah Arendt's notorious "banality of evil" thesis, Voegelin contends that there was nothing banal about the followers of Nazism. They were "spiritually disordered" and they chose their tyrant willingly.

Voegelin also situates the rise of Nazism in the wider crisis of the West. A statement of Novalis—"The world shall be as I wish it"—summarizes for Voegelin the defective nature of modernity (88). The modern will to despise and then transform reality contributed to Nazism. Indeed, the related replacement of God with Man in totalitarianism, according to Voegelin, underpins the "political religions" of liberalism, Marxism, and other leveling

movements. This "gnostic" feature of modernity, as Voegelin warns in his other works, persists well after the fall of Nazism.

Voegelin is particularly hard on the German church (evangelical and Catholic) for misusing the Pauline doctrine of obedience to secular authority. Any Christian who invoked this excuse represented "a complete failure to be a member of human society" (182). The church, since the Middle Ages, also contributed to the dark side of modernity because of its decision to establish itself as the guardian of the natural law tradition. Yet natural law, Voegelin warns, was never meant to be used for an other-worldly institution like the church. Natural law (not precisely a Greek term), is a pagan understanding of "a worldly idea of order," and is therefore political, not religious (208–9). The church should not attempt to transform politics.

The reader familiar with Voegelin's ideas should feel confusion at this point. Although Voegelin claims in other works that Christianity *advances* beyond Greek philosophy, here he suggests that the church failed to grasp the truth of natural law, which is presumably independent of revelation. Indeed, he takes a position, similar to his fellow political philosopher Leo Strauss, that Jerusalem never truly surpassed Athens. Where, exactly, does Voegelin stand on the relation between reason and revelation? Voegelin also faults the church for being insufficiently universalistic and politically minded (and thus rationalizing its immoral indifference to the Jews). Still, *contra* Voegelin, had the church been a true guardian of the natural law tradition (which commands both universalism and political involvement), perhaps it would have mounted a more effective opposition to Hitler. Indeed, the true crisis of the West may lie in the *lack* of usage of natural law in the church, not the preponderance of it.

GRANT HAVERS

Trinity Western University, Canada

Marshall McLuhan: Cosmic Media. By Janine Marchessault (London: Sage, 2005), xix + 253 pp. \$82.95 cloth.

Since his death in 1980, Marshall McLuhan has inspired a vast and appreciative literature,

often rivaling the popularity which he enjoyed as a media sage in the late 1960s. This interest is particularly evident among contemporary left-wing academics. Whereas in his heyday the Marxist left scorned McLuhan as a lapdog of corporations, the postmodern left now seeks in his studies various strategies for emancipating the oppressed.

Janine Marchessault stresses the *political* meaning of McLuhan's ideas. In rejecting the conventional view that his first book, *The Mechanical Bride* (1951), was the first and last political work in his oeuvre, she contends that McLuhan's moral and political critique of the media "remained remarkably consistent throughout his career" (68). Far from being neutral on the effects of technology, McLuhan successfully opened up a cornucopia of insights which the left can find ideologically useful. Far from just offering a typical conservative devotion to masculine values, McLuhan's critique of the objectification of women in advertising is beneficial to the feminist cause (57–60). Far from defending capitalist globalization, McLuhan decried the corporate idolizing of image and instead called for creating "the dream of a universal phenomenology or common culture" (201). Armed with McLuhan's probes, readers can find ample opportunity to develop a liberating "pedagogy" (224).

While the author should be commended for detecting a consistently political message in McLuhan's writings, she has ignored the essentially *right-wing* implications of his politics. Although she devotes a chapter to his Catholic faith and occasionally admits that there is a "reactionary" side to his ideas, she never acknowledges that these biases are the truly recurrent ones. The author complains that "nobody reads McLuhan" (xv); but instead of reading him with an eye to the original intent of his works, she has reinterpreted the intrinsic meaning of his ideas to fit the Frankfurt School or Foucault.

Yet McLuhan always saw himself (like his heroes G. K. Chesterton and Wyndham Lewis) as a Catholic opponent of modernity. From *The Mechanical Bride* onwards, he despised the liberal, individualistic, and private world fostered by the print age. (In 1977, he condemned the Industrial Revolution as a "bloodbath.") Unlike most conservatives, McLuhan saw no hope in resisting technological change or much

reason to embrace it. The transition from print to electronic media was welcome to him, as it would herald a rebirth of community culminating in an austere and traditionalist sexual morality (as he predicted in his 1968 *Playboy* interview). The "role-playing" of the young in the age of television would foster a new appreciation of simultaneity, while burying alienating individualism. The "global village" would become an electronic version of the medieval cosmos, tragically extinguished in the print age. In fine, that most revolutionary force, technology, would actualize right-wing myths. In McLuhan, Catholic natural law met technological historicism.

Despite the author's procrustean efforts to represent McLuhan as a fellow traveler of the left, this postmodern poseur demonstrated that opposition to modern capitalism comes from *both* sides of the political spectrum.

GRANT HAVERS

Trinity Western University, Canada

Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community. By Hauke Brunkhorst (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), xxv + 262 pp. \$42.50/£31.50 cloth.

Hauke Brunkhorst's *Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community* is part of the long-standing MIT Press Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. In the series are well regarded works by Theodor W. Adorno, Jurgen Habermas, Claus Offe, among others. The carry-over power of the Hegelian-Marxian "dialectical reasoning" is certainly to be found in Brunkhorst's book. And however resistant he is to the authoritarian tendencies in nineteenth-century German romanticism, a resistance fueled by a decent regard for the work of Hannah Arendt and, to a lesser extent, for that of Herbert Marcuse, the appreciation of the post-Kantian element, as carried forth in the work of other figures in the series such as James Bohman, is simply less in evidence.

Underneath the rhetoric of European solidarity herein offered as a model—or at least West European solidarity—is the long-standing animus between the French and German visions of social theory. While proper

obedience is made to Rousseau, the Enlightenment and the Jacobin tradition, the heart and soul of the volume belongs to the German tradition of social order that extends from Hegel to Habermas. The democratic vision and constitutionalism being offered is clearly predicated on law rather than custom, central authority rather than federal dispersion. To be sure, the strong Germanic tradition that sees England and America as somehow beyond the pale of the continental tradition is omnipresent. Again, while proper bows are made in the direction of *fraternity*, it is seen as a weaker and far less organizational sound premise for a New Europe than is *solidarity*.

The problem is that in its strong form, the version predicated on *solidarity*, presents considerable problems as to what constitutes a united Europe. It is no accident that the author's rueful remark that only Poland sought and achieved independence from tyranny on its own revolutionary recognizance, with the imputation that the rest of East Europe is more irritant than add-on in the grand design of Europe, is the ghost in the EU machine. Beyond that, it is scarcely an accident that the fate of Turkey, which meets every functional requirement for membership in the New European Union—but very few of the cultural aspects—is simply not part of the discourse of Brunkhorst's book, which, after all, is centered on the future of democracy in the European Union. That points to a larger problem of avoidance: the absence of serious discussion of language differentiation, normative distinctions in ethnic, gender and racial relations, profound schisms between Christian and Moslem traditions. The list of such matters glossed over seriously weakens a sense of purpose or direction for the book; worse, it points to failure to examine alternative visions and viewpoints on the fate of the European Union.

The constant point and counterpoint of the work, iterated and reiterated in a variety of themes and variations, is "the constitution within the democratic constitutional state," which, the author holds, is "simultaneously the evolutionary solution of functional problems." It is a "coordinating of the achievements of hierarchical functional systems with one another and with their human environment—and the evolution solution of normative

problems—renewing through political self-determination the solidarities consumed in the course of functional differentiation." If this strikes the chord of Talcott Parsons at Heidelberg, it is because the author is drawn quite close to this general model of the particular and the universal, the functional and the structural, the legal and the normative (99). It is little wonder that the Girondist parliamentary vision of French thought finds small space in such thinking. Instead, the presumed Jacobinism of Rousseau prevails to the total exclusion of open-ended visions of a Diderot or Voltaire.

The vision of a united Europe is certainly welcome as an outcome of the dialectical tradition, and Brunkhorst can hardly be faulted for seeing this as a way out of the long tradition of conflict modalities that have torn Europe to shreds and reduced it to ashes of world wars. But one must wonder about an author who speaks of Silvio Berlusconi and his wide open Italy as a "police state," one that "clubbed to the ground" people in search of global solidarity, with nary a mention of the actual fascist police state. And to conclude the opening remarks with an invocation of a Robespierre-like defense of Jacobin slogans as a forerunner to the Leipzig demonstrations of 1989 that "we are the people," is well intentioned, but hardly on target. We are never informed what these street riots opposed—other than an implicit Gestapo–Stasi dictated police state.

The problem with Brunkhorst's valiant effort is that the legal state he advocates was also very much part of the Nazi arsenal of oppression and exploitation. Every step on the way to the concentration camps and ovens was demarcated by the Nazis with legal precedent—thousands of rules, regulations and laws. This is fully documented in a little known work by Joseph Walk released in 1996 in which the full, tragic listings of nearly 2,000 rules, regulations decrees, and laws—some secret but most quite public—aimed at the discrimination, intimidation and destruction of so-called inferior peoples by the master race is contained in *Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS Staat*. I have no doubt Brunkhorst would agree that all of these promoted solidarity rather than fraternity. Indeed, even the idea of a united Europe was trumpeted as part of 1,000 years of peace under the banner

of the Third Reich. But a text in which Germany between 1933 and 1945 hardly exists, and the name of Hitler emerges once only, and then in passing, and Mussolini not at all, raises thorny and unanswered questions about the superiority of solidarity as a concept over the Franco-American preference for fraternity and equality.

That said, it must be noted in fairness to the text that the author is a strong advocate of human rights, bans on torture and slavery, prohibitions on the use of force (although where the law derives its power of enforcement remains quite fuzzy in such a world), and the right of people to self-determination. The problem is that so much of this thinking is top-down, dictated by “legally binding international constitutional law” (142). The same problems arise with respect to his philosophically grounded United Europe, in which we are promised a “transnational system of economy, a fully integrated labor market, a single currency, a central bank, and a fully differentiated European law” (163).

Despite this notable, if somewhat truncated, effort to link the Hegelian belief of the state as the expression of national destiny to the Kantian sense of international organization, once again, the expression of faith in the European Community as an administrative instrument is so strong that even the author is compelled to consider, albeit quickly reject, the idea that “democratic popular sovereignty” would or could be crushed by the weight of the state as a source of institutional order. The strong Germanic *Geisteswissenschaft* tendency to see the issue not so much in terms of *solidarity*—the starting premise to the book, but of *order*, its undaunted conclusion—seriously weakens the theoretical edifice of the book, and moreover, compromises its moral force. We are left with a tract for a European Union which sees itself as antithetical to the Anglo-American Union. Whether this is actually the high road for a democratic consensus is hard to demonstrate, especially in the absence of any consideration of alternative trends or empirical limitations of any general theory of sovereignty—sociological or philosophical.

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
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A Compulsion for Antiquity: Freud and the Ancient World. By Richard H. Armstrong (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), xii + 305 pp. \$35/£18.95 cloth.

Richard H. Armstrong provides a very thorough investigation of the impact of classical culture on the institution and development of Freud and his life's work. Also brought to the foreground is the question of whether Freud's world view is so heavily implicated in the cultural ambience of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Vienna that it diminishes its contemporary relevance. Here the author brings to bear the discipline of mnemohistory to elucidate the problem. How exactly was the ancient world conceived and remembered by Freud and his contemporaries, and how distinctive and individual was Freud's own use of the ancient heritage?

Freud's education at the gymnasium clearly had a great impact, and the interest in collecting classical antiquities had its genesis in his education. He visited Athens for the first time in 1904 with his brother, by which time both were the successful offspring of a Jewish father who had been a modest businessman of Central European origin (from Freiburg in Moravia; Priber in the Czech republic). It represented their final coming of age as true Europeans, educated Jews, in this generation educated to achieve a truly European identity.

Interestingly, the first insight into Freud's compulsion for antiquity is to be drawn from fiction; of course, this is common ground with the Oedipus legend. Armstrong discusses (with a sense of humour) Freud's approach in the 1907 analysis of the archaeologist Norbert Hanold in Wilhelm Jensen's 1903 novella *Gradiva*. Here a fictional character is able to engage in a process of sublimating his sexual desires through research, and the implications of Freud's approach are carefully reviewed.

Freud's study was crammed with artefacts and books about antiquity, spilling out into his consulting room; this was to him a matter of great pride and an indication of his diversity—a man with interests outside his work. He wrote to his friend Stephan Zweig: “I have made many sacrifices for my collection of Greek, Roman and Egyptian antiquities, and have actually read more archaeology than psychology” (34). Although he saw this as a hobby, Armstrong shows how he would take

his antiquities away on his holidays, and how items from his private collection would intrude into his works. Psychoanalysis itself as a procedure was seen as comparable to an excavation.

It is impossible in a short review to cover the scope of this rich book. Amongst more important investigations, there is an analysis of Freud's use of the Oedipus legend. Freud's was a very literal reading of the Oedipus legend, a tale of incest and parricide, in which there is a unique oracle where crimes are specified in unambiguous terms. Normally, Delphic oracles do not turn out to be literally true, though they often seem disturbing at a surface reading. A sample of Freud's view follows: "Like Oedipus, we live in ignorance of these wishes, repugnant to morality, which have been forced upon us by nature, and after their revelation we may all of us well seek to close our eyes to the scenes of our childhood." This use of fiction to understand the real world can also be seen as relevant to Freud's study of Leonardo, who shows some important similarities to the fictional Hanold:

The core of his nature, and the secret of it, would appear to be that after his curiosity had been activated in infancy in the service of sexual interests he succeeded in sublimating the greater part of his libido into an urge for research.

Note the parallel with Norbert Hanold, but unlike Hanold, Leonardo remained a sublimated homosexual, according to Freud. This was based on flawed biographical data about Leonardo, which in Freud's view proved that Leonardo in his first years lived alone with his mother, who suffocated him with affection and thus stunted his psychosexual development. Problematic here is the notion that the biographical reconstruction can lead to incontrovertible facts. There is a great leap from this to the full understanding of the sexual institution of the subject. Armstrong's investigation of these biographical materials is valuable and entertaining.

HUGH LINDSAY
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The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing

the American Dream. By Jeremy Rifkin (New York: Penguin, 2004), viii + 434 pp. \$25.95 cloth.

The American Dream—a force that has changed thousands of lives and created a world superpower—is losing influence to the “European Dream,” says Jeremy Rifkin. In his book, *The European Dream*, Rifkin boldly explains how in a world based on networks, technology, and communities, America's individualistic “dream” cannot keep up. Instead, transnational groups that work together can keep up with a changing world, its technology, and its markets to produce a better quality of life for all. Rifkin argues that the European Dream, focusing these characteristics, is the world's new example and is eclipsing the influence of the American Dream.

As an American, Rifkin acknowledges the success of the American Dream and its impact on thousands of lives, including his own. Due to America's unique history and geography, the American Dream has championed freedom, hard work, personal responsibility for one's welfare and destiny, and staunch individualism. Rifkin explains that even US foreign policy epitomizes these feelings of individualism; except for certain periods, the United States has predominantly been extremely isolationist in its foreign policy.

Rifkin recognizes the dream as the reason of American dominance, but says that a new world based on networks and communities has no need for isolationism. Countries may survive, but they will be surpassed by countries on the cutting edge. The technology revolution has erased borders and created a much smaller world. Rifkin argues that, while the traditional nation-state could survive on its own in the past, it cannot keep up with the new trans-border markets. These markets are too big and too fast-paced for individual nation-states. Rifkin says that countries must group together to keep up with these new markets. For this reason, Rifkin says that the American Dream cannot be dominant for much longer. Because Americans believe that they can “go it alone,” as Rifkin often says, they cannot work with others and often ignore anyone that tells them their cars waste too much gas, their crops destroy fertile soil, and they do not help developing countries. A cross-national union, not a defense treaty or free-trade agreement,

is something America seems incapable of joining because of its individualism.

The European Union, however, will thrive in this new world. This union, Rifkin explains, has created a new dream: the European Dream. The dream consists of 25 countries—tired of war and competition—giving sovereignty to a union that will help everyone stay afloat in a changing world. A vital part of the dream is the creation of a European market where countries share goods and ideas to keep up with technology. The European Dream's purpose is to create a better life for each European through teamwork, not individuality. Thus, Europeans work together to produce welfare programs, promote cohabitation with the environment, and encourage more quality time enjoyed with friends and family than spent at the office. Rifkin predicts that other regions will follow the EU once countries realize the benefits of doing so.

Rifkin's work is not only intriguing and interesting, but also eye-opening for any reader. In fact, surprising people seems to be his objective. He sometimes looks too far for surprising evidence to support his argument. Yet his argument demands attention because it involves an issue that directly impacts the world's future. He brings his argument to life with stories and examples and is not as biased as he might seem. As an American, he expresses his love for America and its dream but says that it cannot be dominant on a global scale in the future.

One should remember that some of Rifkin's predictions concerning the EU may become invalid as time goes by. For example, he explains that the new European Constitution, which would be ratified within two years of 2004, will continue to unite Europe. In 2005, however, the French and Dutch rejected it. Rifkin cannot be held accountable for that, besides the fact that the EU could still approve something within the time frame he predicted. In any case, one should carefully observe Rifkin's predictions along with the relevant course of events.

This book is necessary to understand today's world and its problems and how two different dreams confront them. America and Europe are different places with different histories, ideas, and visions of the future. Only time will tell which vision (maybe neither

or both) will prove best for facing the challenges of the future. However, bold predictions by people like Rifkin—even if proven wrong—offer readers a fresh idea that could become revolutionary.

CLINTON R. LONG

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Chosen People: Sacred Sources of National Identity. By Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), xxi + 330 pp. £20.00 cloth.

In 1978 Sir Isaiah Berlin published in *Foreign Affairs* his essay "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power." Although ostensibly dealing only with the major political thinkers of the nineteenth century, who, Berlin claimed, had commonly failed to perceive the significance of national sentiments and movements, he was equally, even if only tacitly, critical of those modern scholars like Elie Kedourie who duly acknowledged the "present power" of nationalism, yet then dismissed it as a modern aberration of traditional communal association, based on the fabrication of new political languages and lineages, or, to use the term that has since become fashionable—the "invention of tradition." Berlin was acutely aware of such and other fallacies of nationalism, but he reasoned that in order to understand why and how it has become so powerful in modern social reality, it was necessary to regain the deeper truths of this ideology, namely, the emotional conditions and convictions of those who literally make up the nation.

Unfortunately, in the vast literature on nationalism of the last three decades, there have been few attempts to follow Berlin's example. The leading scholars who wrote on the topic—Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly, Patrick Gearty—have been largely suspicious of the authenticity of national sentiments and movements, and have sought to debunk them by either old Marxist or new postmodernist theories. During this period, the historian Anthony D. Smith established himself as their most poignant opponent, the true heir to Berlin's humanistic conception of the nation

as an inevitable, and moreover valuable, source of communal and personal identity. In a series of books bearing such indicative titles as *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1998), *National Identity* (1993), *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (2000), or *The Nation in History* (2002), he laid out the theoretical and historical foundations for a revisionist conception of nationhood. Setting out from the anti-positivistic assumption that the explanation of human actions and creations in history must always include—and perhaps even take the form of—an attempt to recover and interpret their subjective meanings from the point of view of the agents performing them, Smith has sought to re-assess the primordial origins and dimensions of modern nations so as to show, against the above-mentioned critical scholars and other “modernists,” how certain pre-rational motivations and traditions have formed and still sustain these human associations. In his new book he turns his attention to one peculiar tradition that permeates the history of many (and probably all) nations: the belief in the divine origins of their ancestry and territory, to wit, that they are all “Chosen Peoples.”

Drawing on his initial definition of the nation as “a human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members” (24), Smith concentrates on the myths and memories by which various nations have consecrated their histories. The paradigmatic case is of course that of ancient (and modern) Israel. Smith, however, offers a much wider range of other historical peoples—from the medieval Armenians to the Boers in South Africa—who shared this conviction, and then goes on to show how these convictions still empower, however obliquely, such quintessential modern European nations like Switzerland or Ireland.

These and numerous other cases, all meticulously and clearly elaborated, serve to corroborate Smith’s basic contention that the nation is a modern form of secular and popular religion, which offers the people what they really need and what in other times and circumstances they usually received from traditional religion: a “communion,” a sense of belonging, a homeland, which have become all the more important in urban social reality that

is full of “liberty” and “equality” but devoid of any “fraternity.”

JOSEPH MALI
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Islam at War: A History. By George F. Nafziger and Mark W. Walton (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), viii + 278 pp. \$39.95/£22.99 cloth.

This book is written for no clear purpose except to get on the bandwagon of anti-Muslim literature that publishers think will bring upon them a cornucopia of riches. I googled to see if other religions have had the honor of titles such as “Christianity at War” or “Judaism” or “Hinduism at War.” I also checked with the Library of Congress. But there were none. Only Islam’s Qur’an, according to the authors, who have never published on Islamic history and civilization, is a religion that has war at its core: not so, of course, the Mahabharata, or the Books of Joshua and Judges in the Hebrew Scriptures, or the “Christian” accounts (both Catholic and Protestant) of the destruction of the “pagans” of America. This blatant ideological slant is not helped by the presumption of the authors to write about “Islam” without using references that draw on any of the languages of the billion or more people who are Muslim. There is not a single citation from Arabic, Ottoman, Persian, or Urdu: rather, all the entries are secondary—and from exclusively English sources, as if there is not important scholarship in French, Spanish, Italian or Russian.

This unfamiliarity of the authors with the Arabic of Islam led them to endow Arab heroes with Persian–Urdu titles—long before the Muslim armies had reached Central Asia (“Hazrat Hamza” or “Hazrat Salman Farsi,” pp. 8 and 9). Elsewhere, Arabic names and words are spelled with Latin letters whose phonetic sounds do not exist in Arabic, or are just completely mangled. What is “shakhid” (195)? Additionally, we are told that “Abu Bekr succeeds Muhammad as the first caliph” between 622 and 629 (34): but Muhammad died in 632 and only then did Abu Bakr succeed him (and for only two years). Still the authors are confident that in the “Middle East

it is common to hear Westerners referred to generically as ‘Franks’” (49). Exactly when and where in the Middle East? How do the authors get their certitude about the views of 300 million people in the Middle East? On page 39 we are told that a Muslim potentate “had been busily making war on a relative—the normal occupation of the Muslim Middle East, when the crusaders arrived”—but not the normal occupation of the Christians who launched the Crusades? On page 53 we are told about “Tamerlane’s horrific sixteenth-century destruction of Delhi,” but then on page 57 we are told that the “year 1398 was a year of devastation, as the Mongol Khan Timu (or Tamerlane) raided into India.” *Was “Tamerlane” Methuselah?* But on page 144, we are assured that he was not, since he died in 1405. The title of chapter 10 is “Mullahs and Machine Guns”: while alliteration is attractive, it is inaccurate to apply the term “Mullah” to the Muslim hierarchy of the Near East.

Most disingenuously, however, are the repeated and rather painful attempts on the part of the authors to show why their topic is “relevant” today after “the events of September 11, 2001” (dust jacket): many a historical episode is important for the authors because it points, in a mimetic fashion, to its fulfillment today. “The slaughter of the men and the enslavement of women and children of a defeated tribe or city would become a common practice as the Islamic Empire expanded” (10)—and, of course, continued, as bin Laden demonstrated (169, n. 1). This mimetic method recalls some television evangelists in the United States (and maybe elsewhere) who find a passage in the book of Daniel or Revelation and then promptly conclude that it points to events in our modern world. Perhaps the strange kind of faith of these evangelists justifies their strange practice of biblical interpretation.

But a history book should not be an exercise in mimesis steeped in generalization and error. This book is.

NABIL MATAR

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Refracting the Canon in Contemporary British Literature and Film. Edited by Susana Onega and Christian Gutleben

(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 261 pp. €52.00/\$65.00 cloth.

Informed by a reciprocal view of the relation between past and present, the 12 essays collected in this volume make valuable contributions to the persistent debates regarding the status of literary and cinematic adaptations of canonical works. As the editors explain, the essays explore the interrelation between contemporary and historical representations by using the “new concept of refraction instead of the well-known notion of intertextual relations” (7). The editors define “refraction” as entailing “a dialectic relation between the canonical and postmodernist texts, affecting the result as well as the source, the new text as well as the old one, the modern product as well as the original prototype” (7). Although the theoretical discussion of “refraction” is frustratingly brief and undeveloped, the essays in the volume amply demonstrate the richness of the concept.

The essays focus mainly on fiction and drama, often from standpoints that stress the crossing of cultural as well as historical boundaries. For example, Catherine Pessoa-Miquel’s opening essay explores “the motif of illegitimacy” (17) in Laurence Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* and Salman Rushdie’s *Midnight’s Children* in a manner that mutually revises our understanding of both authors. Turning to less canonical texts, John A. Stotesbury persuasively argues that, in recent Anglophone novels by Islamic women, Western stereotypes about Islam are challenged in ways that refract both “Western and postcolonial literary forms and values” (72). Scrutinizing Scotland’s relation to the British canon, Dietmar Boehnke proposes that, being simultaneously insiders and outsiders within the United Kingdom, contemporary Scottish writers are able to engage in a “double refraction of the canon” (66). Essays by Fernando Galván, Petra Tournay, and Nicole Boireau confront the issues of cultural reciprocity posed by contemporary refractions of Shakespeare. The essays by Galván and Tournay are particularly compelling, since they show how Black British writing challenges the exclusionary assumptions about blood and belonging that have been an unfortunate part of Shakespeare’s canonical legacy. Other essays use the concept of refraction to revitalize our

assumptions about literary genre. Margarida Esteves Pereira brings out the ambivalence in A. S. Byatt's use of pastiche in *Possession*, while Jean-Michel Ganteau depicts Jeanette Winterson's fiction as going beyond mere parody in its defamiliarizing, affect-based "refraction of canonical romance" (184).

Surprisingly, only two essays directly explore cinematic refractions of the canon. Abandoning the emphasis on self-conscious appropriation that informs other essays, Kirsten Stirling intriguingly (but somewhat unconvincingly) reads David Fincher's film *Fight Club* as an unintentional reworking of Robert Louis Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and James Hogg's *Justified Sinner*. Celestino Deleyto Alcalá maintains a more conventional notion of intention in her shrewd readings of Heckerling's *Clueless* and Rozema's *Mansfield Park*, two films that reflect a recent interest in translating Austen's heroines into the idiom of contemporary discourses of femininity.

The collection includes some intriguing efforts to recontextualize the concept of postmodernism. Exploring what he terms "Post-Victorian fiction," and noting the extent to which "the Victorian age has become historically central to late postmodernism" (110), Georges Letissier makes a strong case for regarding postmodern "rewritings of the Victorian Age" as drawing out "the potential plurality of the texts of the Great Tradition" in a way that manages, by means of refraction, "to open up the Victorian legacy" (127). J. Hillis Miller similarly links refractive adaptations of the canon to an ambivalent, postmodern desire to engage simultaneously in "homage and critique" (130). In his reading of *The Quincunx*, he shows how Charles Palliser's simulacral Victorianism provides an exemplary instance of "parody as revisionary critique" (147). In the emphasis that Letissier and Miller both place on the constructive aspects of the hermeneutics of adaptation, we get a sense of how the collection's analyses of refractions of the canon might be seen to support the editors' claim "that the novel continues to be or can become again an important epistemological tool" (14). However, far from returning us to what the editors call "a clearly referential critical emphasis" (14), the concept of refraction that is

pursued in this collection remains deeply implicated in the aporias of interpretive self-reflexivity. Miller slyly points this out when, after calling *The Quincunx* "a genuine, authentic postmodern novel" (147–48), he remarks that "genuine and authentic are among the values undermined by postmodern fiction" (148).

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Postmodernism: A Beginner's Guide. By Kevin Hart (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2004), x + 179 pp. £9.99/\$15.95 paper.

The first two sentences of the introductory "author's note" to this book announce its goal and orientation: "This book is an introduction to postmodernism for people who know little or nothing about it. Special interest is taken in the questions of how religion stands in the postmodern world and how postmodernism stands before religion" (ix). Kevin Hart succeeds remarkably well in providing an accessible and surprisingly comprehensive introduction to postmodern thought. This is actually no small achievement, given the material he has to work with. As Hart warns the reader on the very first page: "people do not agree about what postmodernism is, where to go to see its main sights, or even if one can distinguish its central features from others that are less significant" (1).

The book has seven chapters. In chapter 1, "Postmodernism: Some Guides," Hart offers some helpful history along with definitions of many of the usual terms that typically baffle the uninitiated. In chapter 2, "The Loss of Origin," Hart presents general outlines of anti-essentialism, anti-realism, and anti-foundationalism and demonstrates how these three "theories" are to be found lurking beneath the surface of postmodern thinking. For such a brief review—the chapter's a mere 20 pages in length—the treatment is surprisingly comprehensive (although Derrida's relation to Husserl is given a mere two pages, and this does justice to neither thinker). Hart somehow manages to capture the central features of these three "theories" and show

how they do indeed play a defining role in postmodernism. The third chapter, "Postmodern Experience," opens by raising two questions: "Are there experiences that have become characteristic of postmodern times? Does postmodernism offer fresh understandings of 'experience'?" (47) Hart suggests that the latter question is the more interesting, as it implies "that experience *itself* has changed in postmodern times" (48), and most of this chapter is devoted to exploring this implication. At this point Hart takes a critical stance toward postmodern thought, rejecting the conclusion that postmodernism marks the end of history and the denial of experience, and this leads him to the consideration of "The Fragmentary" in chapter four. Hart approaches the notion of "fragment" through the examination of the notions of "totality" and "unity," with appropriate reference to Blanchot and Lévinas along the way.

In the last three chapters of his book, Hart turns to the more explicit treatment of religion in postmodernity. He opens this treatment in chapter 5—"The Postmodern Bible"—with a brief review of the manner in which Harold Bloom, Blanchot and Derrida have made use of the Bible in their works. In chapter 6, "Postmodern Religion," after mention of the dangerous rise of Christian fundamentalism to political prominence and a brief account of the postmodern theology of Mark C. Taylor and Thomas J. J. Altizer and the "school of radical orthodoxy" (112), here represented by John Milbank, Hart offers a comparatively lengthy discussion of Derrida. He reads both Heidegger and Derrida as indicating "the way to elaborate a non-metaphysical theology" (113), which he sees as consistent with "Derrida's idea of religion without religion" (126). A good portion of chapter 7—"The Gift"—is devoted to the debate between the "non-metaphysical phenomenology" of Jean-Luc Marion and the philosophical theology of John Milbank. Hart concludes this chapter, and the "argument" of the entire book, by affirming with Milbank, in a truly postmodern spirit, that it is only theology that can overcome metaphysics.

JEFF MITSCHERLING
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Jealous Gods and Chosen People: The Mythology of the Middle East. By David Leeming (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ix + 150 pp. \$22.00 cloth.

In *Jealous Gods and Chosen People*, we have a quick and handy exposition of Middle Eastern mythology and its historical context. Part 1 (3–28) outlines the history of the region variously known by the names Near East, Levant, Middle East, and Fertile Crescent. The history, geography, languages, and religions of the region—and the interactions of all the various peoples in the region from the Paleolithic Age to the Crusades—is clearly and simply presented. Part 2 (31–129) presents the pantheons and myth-cycles of the prehistoric period (insofar as can be deduced from archeological discoveries), the Mesopotamians, Egyptians, the peoples of Anatolia, the Western Semites, and the Arabian peninsula. The heroes, gods, demons and their exploits are clearly described and similarities pointed out.

It is the brief Epilogue (131–32) that is most disappointing, however. Although the book jacket promises a "provocative Epilogue" that explores "today's crisis in the Middle East" as a conflict based in competing mythologies, the three paragraphs of the Epilogue do little more than make the rather simplistic assertion that "various violent, clearly immoral, and illegal actions . . . occurring in the Middle East today are all too often justified by significant and influential combatants on the grounds of what can only be called myths" (131). Leeming cites Rumi, who wrote: "Sometimes visible, sometimes not, sometimes devout Christians, sometimes staunchly Jewish. Until our inner love fits everyone, all we can do is take daily these different shapes" (132) and laments that all too often "history confuses these mere shelters for ultimate reality."

This book would be best utilized as a quick reference or as a text for an introductory course on the mythologies of the region, at either the college or an AP high school level. It presumes no background and attempts no in-depth analysis of the mythology presented. The simplistic treatment of Moses (and other leading figures of Jewish history), Jesus, and Islamic tales—seeing these as simply variations on ancient mythological figures and events—will no doubt bewilder or anger many of the

students assigned to read the text, however. Any instructor who assigns this as classroom reading needs to plan extensive time to flesh out Leeming's ideas in this section and answer student objections.

The book includes diagrams and detailed maps, which even those familiar with the territory will find helpful reminders of who-was-where and when.

STEPHEN MORRIS
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Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of Memory in France. By Joan B. Wolf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), x + 249 pp. £33.95 cloth.

This study is based on a thesis and on an article that appeared in the journal *History and Memory* in 1999. The events analysed here stop also at this date, although the book appeared in 2004. It would have been even more interesting and useful had the author updated her material to include the gains of the *Front national* in the 2002 presidential election and the recent rise in anti-Semitism among the Moslem population of France, a phenomenon apparently underplayed by the *European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia* (EUMC). An appropriate ending to Joan Wolf's study might then have been the recent discourse of those who use the Internet, whether Moslem publications or Left and Right wing anti-globalisation journals, as these reinterpret Moslems as proxy victims of a "Nazi" Israeli state.

The author begins with the 1967 Six Day War, and convincingly shows how at this time and subsequently French politicians were at best indifferent to the historical wounds suffered by French survivors of the Vichy mass deportations, and at worst were apologists of the Vichy regime, itself inheritor of a long and disreputable history of French anti-Semitism. Indeed it is not clear why the author began her narrative as late as 1967.

That said, Wolf relies mainly on a study of the Press to show how the Holocaust was reinterpreted and appropriated by various groups and individuals who seized upon the horrors of the Shoah to assess the culpability or otherwise of the Collaboration or to reinvent themselves as victims at least as

worthy as the Jews who had earlier claimed that role.

There are interesting and depressing accounts of reactions to the Eichmann trial, the trials or acquittals of Touvier, Papon, and Barbie, a President's insensitive choice of an Auschwitz survivor to change the law regarding abortion, concerns to placate Germany, the rise of Revisionism, the scandalous laying of wreaths upon the grave of Petain, the bombing of synagogues and the impaling of a Jewish corpse. Wolf chronicles too the rise of Jewish assertiveness, faced as French Jews were and are with the indifference of the French state, and analyses the ways in which various pressure groups appropriated Jewish suffering for their own ends (the author overuses the word *trauma*), and how at last Chirac apologised, however parsimoniously, for the past mass murder of thousands of France's native and foreign Jews.

Some translations from the French are wooden, even wrong [Elath for Eilat, the Just Ones instead of the Just, Adolph for Adolf, or "we will enter into the career" (169)]. The author never explains why French Jews seem to believe in a "true France" in contrast with an "official" France. Her style can be clumsy, too, as in "conflicted reaction" (187); or "without contemplating a sense of accountability for or connection to racists" (155). Such lapses should have been corrected by the readers of Stanford University Press.

Nonetheless, this book is a sadly informative account of the insensitivity, if not xenophobia, of many among the French elite between 1967 and 1999. It would have been even more instructive had Wolf updated her research, and had she placed French racism in its European context, which the EUMC does, even though it too underplays the recent rise in French Moslem anti-Semitism.

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Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, Institutions. Edited by Jose Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 319 pp. £62.50 cloth.

In retrospect, John Keane's 1988 *Democracy and Civil Society* was a watershed moment in

contemporary political philosophy. Drawing on his experiences in Eastern Europe, Keane argued that the future of democratic development lay in enriching of “civil society”; a sphere of free, voluntary self-organizations mediating the state and the economic system. Keane was not the first to theorize that space (it has at least a 300-year-old history, and Habermas had written an important analysis of the related idea of the “public sphere” in the 1960s), but his contribution came at the right moment. Within a year the Berlin Wall was torn down, the socialist project seemed dead, and democratic theory in the West was in search of a new conceptual foundation for democratic progress.

Jose Harris’s very good collection of essays aims to interrogate the bold theoretical and practical claims made in support of civil society by tracing its different uses in British history. She chose Britain as the test case because it has long been reputed (especially amongst Continental authors) to have the most robust traditions of voluntary organization and, thus, to be a paradigm expression of the democratic essence of civil society. The text is a collection of 15 chronologically ordered essays ranging in historical focus from the beginning of the eighteenth to the end of the twentieth century. While the content of the essays varies widely, the text does have the unified aim of testing whether British history supports the contemporary understanding of the nature and importance of civil society. The most important elements of that contemporary understanding are the situation of civil society between the state and economy, the essential role that voluntary self-organization plays in creating it, and the link between what Habermas calls the “communicative power” generated in civil society and democratic social organization.

As Harris’s introductory essay reveals, this interpretation of civil society has little in common with its original use in British political theory. One of its first uses is in Hooker, who contrasted civil to natural or “uncivilized” society. From Hooker, through Hobbes to Locke, “civil society” was understood as the sphere of legally regulated private interest that comes into being through the creation of the state. It is not until the Victorian period, and especially in the work of J. S. Mill, that the idea begins to thematize the central importance of civic activity to democratic life.

The 14 essays that follow examine different public controversies, both in England and its colonies (Ireland, India, and Australia), which spurred the creation of different interest and opinion groups and movements. The micro-history of these controversies and the groups that they spawned then serve as grounds against which the theoretical claims made in relation to civil society can be tested. The essays are all rich in historical detail and readily accessible to non-experts. However, reading them from the perspective of a political philosopher, I quite often felt that the larger theoretical issues had little impact on the content of the essays. These issues are mentioned in the introduction, and reiterated in the conclusion, but play little role in organizing the content of the essays themselves. Hence there was little sense that the essays build upon each other towards a set of general conclusions. The lack of an overview concluding essay providing a systematic résumé of the general conclusions warranted by the different papers exacerbates this lack of unity.

That said, the collection does repay reading, and not simply because it gives readers insights into moments of British social and political history they most likely know little about. With some work on the part of the reader important general conclusions do emerge. The two most important, from my perspective, are in tension with each other. The first is that it does seem to be true, as Habermas argues, that voluntary self-organization in civil society both sharpens differences of public opinion and provides direction to democratic governments as to acceptable means of resolving those differences. The second is that this contribution to democratic governance is checked by fundamental exclusions from civil society that have characterized its real history. The essays reveal that the membership of some of the most powerful voluntary organizations have been exclusively male and middle class, and quite often organized against the interests of women, workers, and the colonized subjects of the Empire. Whether these exclusions are contingent aspects of the history of civil society or essential to its structure cannot be determined from the essays presented here. Nevertheless, by bringing them to light the text hones the critical focus of theorists whose exuberance

for new concepts sometimes blinds them to their limitations.

JEFF NOONAN

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John Ruskin: Selected Writings. Edited by Dinah Birch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), xxxviii + 324 pp. \$13.95/£8.99 paper.

Anybody who teaches aesthetic and cultural criticism, as well as intellectual and Victorian history, will be glad to learn of Oxford University Press's accessible and affordable publication of these selected works by John Ruskin. The paperback volume, in the World's Classics series, contains selections from the full range of Ruskin's career (including *Modern Painters*, *The Stones of Venice*, and *Unto This Last*), as well as notes and an introduction by Dinah Birch.

Birch situates Ruskin's work in the context of his life and career more generally. She begins by making the case for continuing to read him: "It is not possible to trace the development of nineteenth-century culture, or its legacies, without knowledge of his work" (ix). She then briefly sketches Ruskin's educational, religious, and aesthetic upbringing, before discussing the themes and works that comprised the three major phases of his adult life. Particularly striking, both in this introduction and in the essays that follow, is the centrality of issues that animate so many classroom discussions and academic debates today: gender, science, imperialism, and environmentalism are present here alongside the more familiar themes of artistic and social criticism in the context of industrialization and urbanization. Birch's introduction focuses primarily on Ruskin's personal and intellectual life, but it is complemented by a timeline that sets his work alongside broader historical and cultural developments as well.

Birch writes that, as both a teacher and a critic, Ruskin strove to help his students and readers to *see*, an ambition realized in "The Work of Iron" (among others). He delivered this lecture to an audience at Tunbridge Wells in 1858, and it was published in *The Two Paths* the following year—the same

year as Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, and George Eliot's *Adam Bede*. He begins by acknowledging that his audience is probably inclined to view rusted iron as spoiled iron, before turning to assert that, in fact, iron only rusts because it has breathed: "Nay, in a certain sense, and almost a literal one, we may say that iron rusted is Living; but when pure or polished, Dead" (106). Far from the residue of a ruined metal, in Ruskin's handling oxidized iron becomes the agent that provides color and vitality to the rocks of England, the granite of Egypt, and the summits of the Alps; iron railings, however, come in for harsher treatment: "Your iron railing always means thieves outside, or Bedlam inside;—it can mean nothing else than that" (116). Through a series of such turns Ruskin takes his musings on an unlovely metal as an opportunity to consider the beauty of the countryside and the life it sustains, and he is doing so at a moment when both seem to him to be under threat from the cruelty, oppression, and exploitation that follow the pursuit of wealth. Ruskin, in other words, has helped us to *see*, and it is thanks to Dinah Birch and Oxford University Press that he can continue to do so for another generation of teachers and critics.

GUY ORTOLANO

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Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires. By Alexander J. Motyl (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 163 pp. \$35.00/£23.50 paper.

This slim book absorbs the author's professional interest as a political scientist in the collapse of the former Soviet Union into a structural explanation for the decline and fall of empires in general. In potential terms, the aim is ambitious; in the event, Alexander Motyl is much more specific in his interest. The question that drives the more abstract and generalizing features of the book is a single one: what can the political scientist who equips himself with a theory of the collapse of empires predict (without succumbing to the temptation to promote a theory of everything) about the aftermath of the Soviet Union?

Motyl attempts a path that will stay clear of the gloom associated with Spengler and Toynbee on the one hand, and the cheeriness evoked at the prospect of “the end of history” by Fukuyama on the other, although his own basic conclusions about the likelihood of a political revival for the power once wielded by Moscow is largely negative. The notion that the former Soviet Union might be placed in the same context as the Habsburg, Ottoman, Romanov, and Wilhelmine empires is novel. It is made slightly more plausible when Motyl defines empires as political systems whose structure of dominance between the core elite and the peripheral elites resembles that of a hub, such that “peripheries interact with one another politically and economically via the core” (8). The metaphor of a hub without a rim is useful in conveying the significance of a structure in which “no significant relations between peripheries and between peripheries and other polities can exist without the intermediation of the core” (17). Not all, or even many, empires conform to this narrow definition, though it does fit the Soviet system fairly closely.

Motyl builds his assessment of the prospects for a revival of Soviet or Russian dominance over its East European neighbors on older, and more general, work done by Johan Galtung (1971, on the structural definition of empire), Karl Deutsch (1954–63, on the disintegration of totalitarian systems, which Motyl treats as isomorphic with empires), and Rein Taagepera (1978–97, on empirical evidence for the theory that all imperial trajectories are fundamentally alike, and can be represented in their standard form as a parabola, though allowances have to be made for various anomalies, and the algorithm of a parabola remains a schematic simplification).

Motyl’s stance towards accounting for large-scale events is fully structuralist: that is, he has no patience with notions of agency; when empires decline and collapse, they do so for reasons that the political scientist ascribes to the system rather than to individual human actions and choices. Readers not sympathetic to this orientation are unlikely to be persuaded by Motyl’s argument; while those willing to give it credence can hope to find food for historical explanation, although the author’s narrow focus on Russia means that the implications of the argument for cases other than that of the

former Soviet Union are either sketchy or unconvincing when dealing with very different kinds of empire, such as those of the British, the French, the Dutch or the Japanese.

The ideas of decline and collapse (“bureaucracies grow, spending booms, economies falter, battles are lost, rebellions succeed,” 39) are refined to distinguish between (a) the attrition to empires and their core–periphery relations through war and liberation struggles, (b) the ways in which decayed empires present anomalies to the student of political history when their decay remains suspended for periods in a state of non–attrition, and (c) the ways in which the aftermath of collapse leads to partial reconstitution based on four structural variables: “the extent of decay, the evenness of decay, the relative power of the former core, and the continuity of the former empire” (9). Motyl points to three instances of imperial decay that were not followed, as the parabolic model might suggest, with rapid attrition: the USSR, Austria–Hungary, and Romanov Russia. His explanation is fourfold: (a) a hyper–centralized core state that maintained organizational control over the periphery, (b) a favorable geo–political environment that could forestall attrition, (c) a favorable geographical location, and (d) internally generated easy money (73). These four factors remain unpredictable anomalies to the larger pattern hypothesized by Taagepera’s parabolas.

For the core of an empire to collapse, it seems that what is needed are shocks: natural disasters (floods, drought, plague, war, etc.); socioeconomic catastrophes (e.g. migrations, economic depressions); or sudden political turns (e.g. the death of a charismatic leader). Motyl’s account of the structural factors that must be in place for a collapsed empire to show any form of revival focuses on a strong post–collapse core that survives the shocks that pushed the empire over an edge. In the case of Russia, he anticipates that there might be a “creeping re–imperialization” (103) of neighboring regions by post–collapse Russia, qualifying this notion with the recognition that only “Russia’s vast natural resources could . . . generate sufficient easy money to keep energy–dependent polities in the fold, maintain a large or effective military, and hold the empire together” (114–15). From the perspective of 2006, it might be said that a complex set of events in Russia, and in its

global relations, have partially overtaken the argument of a book published in 2001, or at least shown the situation to be more complex than the Procrustean elegance of Motyl's structuralism. While his method retains a kind of provocative significance, and his attempt at theory of almost everything manages to look simple and elegant, the predictive scope of his book now seems a little narrow and dated.

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Affects et conscience chez Spinoza: L'automatisme dans le progrès éthique.

By Syliane Malinowski-Charles (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2004), 257 pp. €29.80 paper.

This study, which grew out of the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of Ottawa, attempts to provide an account of the notion of "self-consciousness" in Spinoza, arguing that this notion is intimately connected to his account of affectivity and an important component of the thorny ethical issues raised in Part 5 of the *Ethics*. Whatever the final verdict on the author's account, this is a much-needed study: there are no attempts to provide a full account of consciousness even in the francophone literature, and in its anglophone counterpart many Spinoza researchers follow the conclusion of Jonathan Bennett that in fact Spinoza has no account whatever to offer of consciousness.

The first section of the book (chapters 1–3) develops an outline of what the author calls "*la circularité causale*" in Spinoza as a foundation of what she labels as a dynamic account of affectivity. Two senses of causality are distinguished—vertical (22–27) and horizontal (27–31), the former generating a temporal series and the latter a logical (implicative) series. Mediaevalists will recognise the distinction as one between efficient and formal causality, and anglophone readers will find a similar account in Bennett's and Edwin Curley's use of the Hempel–Oppenheim model of explanation. The notion of "circularity" is unclear to this reviewer, as is the author's claim that one may properly speak of trans-attribute causal relations among modes

as some species of "indirect causality" (62). The closing chapter is a highly successful account of the notion of force (*vis*) as a direct affective apprehension.

The second section (chapters 4–6) is devoted to an account of self-consciousness as rooted in desire in particular and affectivity in general, and this claim is connected in an illuminating manner to Spinoza's account of *conatus* in *Ethics* 3. The connection between conation and consciousness has the implication, denied by many commentators but well-argued here, that non-human animals are not only conscious but also self-conscious for Spinoza (130–32). A further consequence is that Spinoza's god [*deus sive natura* is neither conscious nor self-conscious (140–41)]. What is distinctive about *human* consciousness is that, unlike that of lower animals, it can attain intuitive knowledge (the basis of Spinoza's ethical project). Even here, however, the author notes that the basis by which Spinoza marks this bifurcation of types of consciousness—his claim that the human body is much more complex than the bodies of brute animals—is largely without foundation in or out of his system (133–34).

The third section (chapters 7–9) is devoted to using the new account of consciousness and affectivity to clarify the ethical project which is outlined in *Ethics* 5. To do this the author first provides a "continuist" account of the relation between *ratio* and *intuitio* in Spinoza, arguing persuasively against a number of francophone commentators in her exposition. This rather original account of the three kinds of knowledge leads, in the closing chapter, to an equally original and illuminating account of Spinoza's notions of the "feeling of eternity" and the "intellectual love of god," which are clearly among the thorniest concepts with which the reader of Spinoza must deal.

The brevity of this review cannot do justice to the detail of many of the author's arguments. Another great strength of this study is the author's practice of clarifying her own analyses and conclusions by contrasting them with many of the major French commentators of the past 100 years. This provides an enormous bounty especially for readers not familiar with the extensive body of French commentaries, and it also clarifies in what manner her own position arises from the perception of certain critical problems or

lacunae in these. This is a magnificent study which fills a hole in the existing secondary literature. While there are points in the author's account whose correctness one may question, her arguments are always well-knit and illuminating. The reader cannot complete the reading of this study without the feeling that much light has been shed on major elements of Spinoza's thought which have hitherto been largely ignored.

LEE C. RICE

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The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism: Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Marx. By Arthur Kroker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), vii + 228 pp. \$53.00 cloth.

In this age of unrestrained and frenzied technological change, it is almost comical that we are still surprised when technology results in the opposite of its promises. "Almost," since the effects can be so frightening. Yet, according to Arthur Kroker, even when our technological gains come without catastrophe and we are taken further down the path of progress, having prolonged life, improved the quality of health, increased efficiency and production, etc., there is an ever-growing and all-pervading danger within the techno-culture that we belong to as mostly blind and ignorant members. Like Heidegger, Kroker sets technology over and above human existence, where to live authentically we must find a way of life and discourse beyond the technologically dominated.

As an attempt to draw Being into presence, Kroker's uncanny writing is not at all a standard philosophical work (see a full-text multimedia version at www.ctheory.net). His poetic, personal, and, more often than not, challenging choice of phrases, requires a certain degree of leniency from readers as he thinks "the will to technology" through and beyond the "trauma theorists" Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Marx. These three are prophets, he argues, since they do not speak to us so much from the past as from our future. And while they may be radically different in significant ways, Kroker believes that, taken together, they provide us with privileged access to

understanding our relationship with technology and our immanent destiny, both here and not yet here.

To begin to appreciate the dominant force that is guiding us into the twenty-first century, Kroker argues that we need a revelation that technology itself cannot offer. It is not enough, for Kroker, that we observe and speculate on the impact of the "biotech universe" that is revolutionizing the world both outside and inside our bodies. Thus, his goal is not simply to reflect on new ethical questions created by the frenzied biological and technological industries of our present and near future, such as the mapping of the human genome, organ farms, cloning, artificial intelligence, or to predict how our future will unfold digitally. Such an approach, he claims, cannot ask the questions needed to penetrate through to our technological destiny.

From Heidegger, Kroker realizes that we cannot think the question of technology technologically since it is a will that closes back upon itself. It is a closed universe, a will to will, a will to nothingness, its own fate and truth. Technology has become our completed metaphysics by virtue of which life is ordered, so we must find a way to think life and technology differently. When we do so, Kroker claims, we will begin to see that the essence of technology and our digital future is devastatingly nihilistic.

In Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Marx, Kroker believes we are forewarned of a world, our world, coded by the will to technological nihilism, a metaphysics of non-being that guides us toward a state of permanent annihilation. In fact, we have already become, for Kroker, a culture of the post—post-human and post-species. Contemporary society is intent on its own suicidal nihilism, passively suffocating beneath a blanket of technologizing we seem entirely unprepared to deal with. And while this kind of message is hardly new, Kroker attempts to go about disclosing it in a novel way.

It is mostly with Heidegger that Kroker interacts, since he alone is said to be a fully post-human philosopher. Heidegger is "the radical metaphysician of hyper-nihilism" and key philosopher of the digital future (15). He is the supreme theorist "who provides both a fundamental metaphysics of virtual capital and a searing vision of the twisted

pairs of desolation and freedom as technological destiny” (37). It is in Heidegger, the bridge between Nietzsche and Marx, that we are diagnosed as fated “objectless objects” in a “culture of boredom,” which is the mark of completed nihilism. It is a boredom not so much with things or routines, but one in which Being itself is somehow held back.

In Nietzsche, Kroker finds a century-old prediction of rampant nihilism as the accompanying mark of technological society. Nietzsche is the “poet of technology” and the philosopher of “cynical data” who thinks the “will to not-will.” Kroker identifies in Nietzsche the sort of anti-institutional thinking needed to support his own doomsday views on the advancing will to technology and its culminating nihilism.

Returning to Marx’s theories of capital circulation and insights into “the commodity-fetishism of the nineteenth century” (61), Kroker argues for an image of unfolding capitalism that, having sped up beyond both needed production and consumption, has become “streamed capitalism.” In it we see how technology is materially realized far beyond simple supply and demand as a “commodification of circulation.” Capitalism, for Kroker, has become a “pure circuit of circulation” that “realizes itself in the hyper-reality of virtual capitalism” (118).

Ultimately, Kroker’s intent is to invite readers to (re)think the consequences of our technological surrender. He does not want merely to curb our giddy faith in progress, but to stamp an indelible mark of dread upon our naive participation in evolving technicity. In this sense, the book is meant to be less about the casting of aspersions on the proverbial school-yard bully and more about a new attunement and reevaluation. So while there is an unmistakable darkness and pessimism throughout the entire work, he does not write from a place of total despair but from a will to something else. We can, according to Kroker, think the future outside or beyond our nihilistic annihilation. To that end, he proposes that it might be possible through art to create a new ethics of technology, although his proposal amounts to little more than a token sentiment.

Indeed, there can be little doubt that we are a techno-culture that wills itself toward technology, but that this is nihilistic—a will to

nothingness—is not sufficiently established in Kroker’s account. In fact, there is much that is not clear in this book. Captivated by the meandering chatter of his own prose, only after 40 pages into the book does he begin something resembling an actual examination. And, while this examination is sometimes fruitful and engaging, it nevertheless takes a great effort to make sense of it, since it takes another 20 pages or so before Kroker offers desperately needed, though still sparse, definitions to key concepts. Unfortunately, most terms have few defining properties, and arguments seem awkward—often little more than flagrant name-calling and exaggerated diagnosing of otherwise innocuous phenomena—and the point of the text gets buried under his loose style of writing, which comes across more as drama than as philosophical reflection. Perhaps most frustrating is that he tends toward generalizations, rarely stopping long enough to offer specific “whys,” as if specifics should be obvious, when they are not.

According to Kroker we can expect the voice of nihilism to speak of biotechnology as our destiny—gene splicing, transgenic bodies with modified sensory organs, genetically modified foods and so on. In his foreshowing he believes that, because we are attentive listeners, we are the last generation of our species. But one must be very careful when crying “Wolf!” since it seems clear that biotechnology has many different voices.

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Between Deleuze and Derrida. Edited by Paul Patton and John Protevi (London: Continuum Press, 2003), ix + 207 pp. £16.99 paper.

While the compare-and-contrast methodology is all too frequently employed at every level of academic discourse, there are occasional instances which we can be grateful for. Such is *Between Deleuze and Derrida*, edited by Paul Patton and John Protevi. Both Derrida and Deleuze are decisive thinkers of the twentieth century, and their work justifiably continues to be at the centre of debate throughout the humanities—indeed, there is much in their

respective legacies that is still to be understood. The various points of intersection, their convergences and differences, are even less understood. While it is easy to recognize that the relationship between the two is one of the great contexts for a debate concerning contemporary thought, its past as well as its future, it is difficult to see in what way the rapprochement can be effected.

Patton and Protevi assemble a number of well-known and astute commentators who address a series of issues, including mathematics, love, knowledge and experience, writing, politics, ethics and Platonism. Many of these essays show a welcome familiarity with both of these writers, well-known for their difficulty, and in each case the papers offer analyses which go well beyond the familiar clichés (textual “free”-play, the cultural studies “rhizome,” etc.) The editors also begin with a thorough and informative introduction setting the scene for the pieces which follow.

I began by referring to comparison and contrast. However, the title of the book already belies such a nomination in this case, because what is manifestly at issue is a “between.” This is, of course, a great Deleuzian trope—that we must begin in the middle, that scene and event take place between series, that difference precedes identity. Likewise Derrida’s fundamental insistence on the inter-rogation between self and other guides us towards similar assertions. Unfortunately, and this must be the key criticism to be leveled at this otherwise enlightening volume, it is precisely any attention to this “between” that is lacking. A good example is Plotnitsky’s thorough chapter on mathematics and related figures in the two writers. The chapter can be neatly broken in half, the first of which deals with Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) relationship to mathematics, principally with reference to Leibniz. Then, using the common reference to Mallarmé by both Deleuze and Derrida, the second half is a discussion of the figure of the undecidable (here, Plotnitsky perhaps over-emphasizes the importance of Gödel for Derrida) in the latter’s earlier writings. Only in a footnote (119, n. 9) does Plotnitsky open up the space of a potential disjunction on the topic of the undecidable, which he claims would be understood differently by the two philosophers.

There are, however, a couple of welcome exceptions. Daniel Smith’s “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence” is a thoroughgoing attempt to locate the two thinkers in relation to each other in the space created by the tension of these two eminently problematic terms. While perhaps overemphasizing the importance of Heidegger for Deleuze, he manages through this confrontation to provide a sketched portrait of certain meetings and bifurcations which would call for critique and deconstruction. And, perhaps more importantly, Smith broaches the fundamental problem of *how* to problematize the difference between Derrida and Deleuze, the problem that this book in general leaves unaddressed. Nealon’s chapter, “Beyond Hermeneutics: Derrida, Deleuze and Contemporary Theory,” is likewise a helpful examination on a more general level of the uneasy (non)proximity of the two, and Paul Patton’s “Living a Time Out of Joint” brings about a convincing harmony between Derrida and Deleuze on the entwined matters of time, politics and ethics.

These are difficult thinkers, whose implacable movements are difficult to navigate between. We can hope that in the future this “between” will be investigated with more depth—for now, however, this volume is a welcome *entrée* to an event yet to come.

JONATHAN ROFFE
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Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Post-war Germany and America. By Heide Fehrenbach (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), xiii + 263 pp. £18.95 cloth.

There were 94,000 children born of the Allied occupation of West Germany, of which only 5,000 were born from Afro-American fathers. It is the latter with which this book deals. The author examines the integration of these children into German society in the 1960s. Heide Fehrenbach holds that much historical evidence and social experience has to be ignored in order to claim that Germany after 1945 was race-blind.

These children were not the result of rape. Many women who became pregnant from their black boyfriends applied for legal abortions, on the grounds of their repugnance at such a pregnancy. In judging whether or not to allow the abortion, the issue was persistently viewed as one of "racial pollution." Sex between German women and black American soldiers always provoked censure. Surveys taken at that time prove that what was significant for contemporaries was not the sex itself but the woman's choice of partner. The women themselves were characterised as immoral, mentally impaired or prostitutes. This censure was also present among state officials. Between 1946 and 1948 they attempted to deny public support for mothers with biracial children in Bavaria, where the greatest number resided. Initially, it was not even certain that such children would be given German citizenship.

Once the children were born, much thought was given by officialdom to adoption policies for these children. Adoptions from other countries were encouraged. The "problem," as the Germans saw it, persisted right up until these children were school leavers, when a conference was held, attended, among others, by federal and state officials, to discuss how the first wave of black school leavers should be handled.

A significant effort is made by the author to demonstrate that the German attitude towards these children was more enlightened when compared to that of the United States at the time. Perhaps; but, in a way, this makes it so much worse. Sleeping with someone who only recently was the enemy was regarded as okay by these German women, but having his child was repugnant?

It was not until the early 1960s when another survey of these children was to be initiated that one of the Federal States refused point-blank to do so, the first instance of an attempt to nullify the German Interior Ministry's practice of keeping separate statistics on its black citizens.

The modern xenophobia of the German state locates the origins of the problem externally rather than treating it as connected to a German history of racism and violence. The author also points out that German racism prior to 1945 was not limited to anti-Semitism. Anti-black feeling was also present and

culminated in the sterilization, although one ought to note, not the extermination, of "mixed-bloods" during the Third Reich. The location of race shifted from Jewishness to blackness in order, the author postulates, to distance it from the Holocaust and Germany's crimes against humanity. In the end, the reader is left disappointed that the Holocaust did not have a greater impact on its initiators in making them more accepting of these children. One does not have to agree with the views of the author to nevertheless see this work as thought-provoking and worthwhile.

MIA ROTH
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Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial.

By Rebecca Wittmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), ix + 336 pp. \$35.00 cloth.

International trials of genocidal crimes attempt to seek both a just sentence and to teach moral historical lessons. *Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial* analyses what happens when a nation tries to deal with its own homicidal past, using its own criminal code in its own state courts, the very ones that not too long before had condoned the very actions that were now being tried. Can such trials deal with any success with crimes of unprecedented magnitude? The answer, according to author Rebecca Wittmann, is no.

The Auschwitz Concentration Camp has today become the most important representation of Nazism and the Holocaust. But this was not yet the case when West Germany organized the trial of some of the perpetrators of the crimes in Auschwitz in the early 1960s. The trial was meant to cover both those who had carried out the Final Solution and those who had given the events at Auschwitz their legality. This was a trial of men who were often unfit for military service but were so enthusiastic to serve the Nazi state that they had made it their job to murder innocent men women and children on a daily basis.

The trial was important for the Germans who could no longer claim that they had no knowledge of what had occurred in the East. It also laid to rest the pervasive

German post-war myth that they were themselves the greatest victims of the war. Unfortunately, the sincere efforts of the public prosecution to teach lessons about the culpability of all involved in the murder of innocents were hindered by the law as it was then defined. Because the prosecutors had to adhere to the rigid interpretations of the murder statute and subjective definitions of perpetrators and accomplices, they finally condemned only those who had exceeded the acts of murder ordered by Hitler and Himmler. The killing of millions in the gas chambers became a lesser crime, calling for a lighter sentence than the murder of one person carried out without orders from superiors. Those who followed orders were exonerated.

The West German criminal justice system passed a prohibition in 1949 on retroactive legislation, so that persons who had committed murders that were not illegal at the time when they were committed could not be indicted for their crimes. This meant that, at this trial, the prosecution was obliged to give the camp regulations at Auschwitz an air of validity.

The testimony of former SS judges was introduced into the trial proceedings and created the impression that those who herded thousands into the gas chambers were less guilty than those who shot prisoners without a legal death sentence handed down by Nazi officials. Many of these Nazi judges retained their posts and were of course themselves extremely lenient with Nazi defendants when such cases came to trial in other instances. The statistics on the justice meted out in post-war Germany to the perpetrators are, in general, dismal: only about 100,000 people were investigated in Germany on the suspicion of having committed mass murder and only 6,500 were actually brought to trial. The West German war trials show a relatively high level of acquittals and a low level of heavy sentences. Only 155 were convicted of murder. Public prosecutors pursued cases without enthusiasm. The investigations were often limited to reports by survivors, who were outraged when they saw their persecutors walking freely on the streets.

In the history of Germany's troubled self-examination, this trial occasioned one of the most important and most public confrontations of the 1960s. For a short time, it brought the atrocities committed in the Nazi era to the

fore of German consciousness, which in itself, from the accounts in Wittmann's book, was an important achievement.

MIA ROTH
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Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. By Christopher Bobonich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), xi + 643 pp. £19.99 paper.

While Plato's *Republic* has always been the focus of much attention, his last and arguably most ambitious work, the *Laws*, has been comparatively neglected. It contains a detailed legislation plan for the foundation of a practicable state, nearest to the ideal of the *Republic*. It has none of the heavy metaphysical apparatus of the earlier dialogue and little of its most unviable proposals, such as communion of wives and children and the abolition of private property. Some of the *Laws* more controversial dispositions, such as the Nocturnal Council, in charge of overseeing the laws, have directly and indirectly, albeit in a simplistic and distorted interpretation, influenced more than one totalitarian or theocratic state.

The *Laws* has never been completely forgotten, but the first years of this century have seen a new spate of scholarly interest in this rather rambling and (for Plato) unusual dialogue. The main interpretive question has remained its relation with the *Republic*. For Plato, the function of the state is to educate its citizens to a life of virtue. In the *Republic*, real virtue is philosophy, the full comprehension of the good, based on adequate knowledge of the Ideas. Without philosophy, only "popular," or political virtue can be had, accustomed virtue, a necessary condition of the state, but totally insufficient for really doing well, that is, for the flourishing of one's soul. "Anitus and Meletus can kill me," so ends Plato's Socrates his *Apology*, "but they cannot hurt me." In the *Laws*, however, the philosopher has no place, and legislation aims at virtue instilled as right opinion. Has the older Plato changed his mind and realized the incompatibility of his utopian state with actual human nature, or is the *Laws* an application of the very same principles, as best as can be done?

Christopher Bobonich's book is well researched, and arguably the most comprehensive monograph on the *Laws* to be published in the last years. He states his theses clearly: at least some non-philosophers are capable of (1) valuing virtue for its own sake, (2) being genuinely virtuous, (3) living happy lives, and (4) valuing for its own sake the genuine well-being or happiness of others and in particular their virtue (90–92).

A short review is not fit for an examination of Bobonich's careful and detailed argumentation. The book is bound to attract much well-merited discussion. Suffice, at this point, to single out one main issue. In *Laws* x, while discussing the theology at the basis of his state, Plato reiterates the anti-Protagorean slogan, "god, not man, is the measure of all things." Bobonich rightly remarks that this does not, in itself, make morals dependent on theology, and reads it as leaving open the possibility of true virtue without full knowledge. But he disregards Plato's distinction between the objective measure (*metron*) and the human mean (*meson*). The *Laws* is aimed at creating the best possible state in the philosopher's absence, much like the prescriptions left behind by the traveling physician of the *Politicus*. The efficacy of those prescriptions depends on the physician's knowledge, which is too general and cannot come fully in his stead. As in the last book of the *Republic*, the non-philosopher in the *Laws* too will attain the much-needed political virtue, and for this he will receive his prizes from gods and men, but will ever live at the brink of a moral precipice, severely guarded lest his opinions cave in under the pressure of his unstable, empirical human nature. The *Laws* can very cautiously promise us political virtue but not the real, unchanging, non-empirical well-doing of the soul.

SAMUEL SCOLNICOV

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Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy.

By Geraldine Heng (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), xii + 521 pp. \$22.50/£15.00 paper.

Empire of Magic, Geraldine Heng's study of the relationship between the medieval romance

and politics, has something for everyone—love, sex, violence, morality and even cannibalism. Unfortunately, this is as much a fault as a virtue, since she attempts to lump this heterogeneity of subjects under one umbrella—the "politics of cultural fantasy." The book is mainly, although not entirely, a collection of papers delivered at various times; each interesting in its own right, but not necessarily a cohesive whole. Heng purports to concentrate on what she considers a "re-beginning" of romance literature in the Middle Ages, although she acknowledges in the Introduction that neither the fact of romance, nor the literature it informs, actually begin then. She asks two questions at the outset: "Why did the King Arthur legend survive... and what, exactly... is a romance?" (ix). In straining to tie her diverse subject matter together, she doesn't quite answer either question. Indeed, after the first chapter, Arthur almost disappears entirely until one brief mention in the final chapter.

Following the Introduction, Heng leaps directly into the cannibalism motif, arguing that at least a portion of romance literature grew out of horrific events which allegedly occurred during the First Crusade. This is a fascinating assertion, and Heng makes a fair case for the reality. According to three supposed eyewitness accounts, the northern Syrian city of Ma'ara was sacked by western Crusaders, who proceeded to roast and eat the bodies of their fallen opponents. In all three accounts, "extreme famine" was the rationale given (22). Further, Heng suggests cannibalism may also have taken place at Antioch, prior to Ma'ara, but the evidence is "of a less secure, more enigmatic kind" (23). She bases her belief on a letter written by the Byzantine princess, Anna Comnena, who describes a famine so destructive that the inhabitants were "reduced to eating meats forbidden by law" (23). From these provocative, but certainly far from certain roots, Heng grows an entire tree of medieval romance. This requires considerable speculation on her part; however, she chooses her examples well enough to make the case.

Heng cites, for instance, the tale of *Richard Coer de Lyon*, which survives in manuscript from the fourteenth century, although undoubtedly based on earlier versions. In this tale, Richard longs for pork flesh to cure

an illness. Pork being unavailable in Muslim lands, the chef unwillingly cooks up a nice, plump Saracen, whom Richard relishes thoroughly, but unknowingly. When he wishes for more, his courtiers bring him the horribly grinning head of the enemy. Richard exclaims in shock at first, and then laughs uproariously. He and his courtiers then share their amusement and rejoice that they never have to hunger again (there are a lot of Saracens). As Heng points out, the real awfulness of the story comes from the fact that the devouring of human flesh is treated as rare humor. To take the edge off, emphasis is on the “blackness” of the Saracen which presumably makes him fair game to be the literal butt of the joke.

Heng then attempts to tie in a burgeoning English national identity to the foregoing horror story by stating that not only has a discourse on cannibalism now appeared in medieval culture but a discourse on medieval nationalism (65). The family that eats together...? Her argument that the whole purpose of the *Coer de Lyon* is to foster a unified England is most probably the case; but a politics of cannibalism to bolster that cohesion is a bit of a stretch, even though the tale does contain a second grisly cannibalistic joke at the expense of the Saracen ambassadors.

So far, so good, and cannibalism does seem to “dog the narratives” (115), or at least a fair number of Heng’s choices. The book, however, tends to split apart at this juncture in spite of her attempts to weld the disparate elements into a logical structure. She turns next to the “Constance group” of romances, as Heng terms them (181), whose heroine is abducted from the West to the East, although the beleaguered heroine appears under various names in some of the group. These tales make an uneasy fit with the earlier chapters emphasizing cannibalism. While they do, indeed, involve the exotic East and the Crusades, it is difficult to discern what branch of Heng’s tree they should hang from. Interesting in their own right as examples of *gender* politics, they seem to belong to a different treatise entirely, even though Heng again stresses the blackness of the Saracens contrasted with the paleness of the heroines; but it’s a loose connection.

The final chapter, which deals with medieval travel narratives, especially that of Sir John Mandeville, fits a little better with the

earlier ones, since “Mandeville” includes many lurid descriptions of anthropophagic Easterners, as well as those who glory in self-mutilation—slicing off parts of themselves in hysterical ecstasy; and it certainly fills the bill of cultural fantasy. Nonetheless, it has a tacked on quality; and, outside of the single mention of Arthur, has little to do with explaining the durability of the Arthur legend.

Heng’s presentation of cannibalism is as a voracious, all-devouring manifestation which she attempts to equate not only with accounts of the actual practice, but sodomy, Jews, women, and, of course, Saracens. She does this in a sesquipedalian prose which detracts from, rather than heightens, the reader’s interest. This is a *bete noir* of mine, I must admit. Many of the books I have read recently have made me long for the ghost of Winston Churchill, whose erudite, literate, and yet clear, simple, prose resonated with the same power as did his sonorous speech. Too many authors have succumbed to the contemporary trend of employing jargon at the expense of clarity. Clarity thus becomes, to use Heng’s own words, a “verbal relic...emptied of any original reference” (44).

LORA SIGLER

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Bombay to Bloomsbury: A Biography of the Strachey Family. By Barbara Caine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), xvii + 488 pp. £25.00 cloth.

This is a composite biography of 12 individuals, Richard and Jane Strachey, the parents, and their ten children, five daughters and five sons. It ranges from 1817 when Richard was born to 1968 when the last child died. Five of the children had notable lives, as did their parents. But one suspects that if it weren’t for one star, Lytton, the family would now be virtually forgotten. It is the attention to the others that accounts for the great strength of this study. We are told how members of the professional upper middle class lived their lives. Hence we enter into their society to a far greater degree than is usually the case. A further benefit is the valuable contribution the book makes to the question of how modern was Bloomsbury

and how “Victorian” was the nineteenth century?

Sir Richard was a modern civil servant, much interested in science, and doing his best to bring to India the blessings of technology, particularly in railroads. Lady Strachey, of a Scottish gentry family, intensely literary, along with her daughter Pippa and her daughter-in-law Ray, made notable contributions to the introduction of suffrage for women and to feminist causes. She was a lively and at times for her children an exhausting lady. Both parents with varying success tried to direct their children to the life of the mind. The “modernism” of the Victorians is balanced by the more old-fashioned aspects of the “moderns.”

Barbara Caine points out Lytton’s limitations in his expectation of being helped by his sisters, his indulgent biography of Queen Victoria, and his shielding his mother from his homosexuality. He was the next to youngest son, the youngest being James, famous as the translator of Freud. The eldest daughter, Elinor, and the two eldest sons, Dick and Ralph, had the most conventional lives. Those two sons followed the family commitment to India but did not have particularly successful careers. The next son, Oliver, was a successful yet unambitious code breaker during the Second World War and a bit of a sexual adventurer. By his first wife he produced an intriguing novelist, Julia. His second wife, Ray, had a distinguished American mother, and Bernard Berenson as a stepfather. She appeared to have married the family rather than Oliver, seeming fonder of its other members, particularly the feminist and brilliant organizer, Pippa, than of her husband. Two other daughters made their mark. Dorothy Bussy achieved some fame as the translator of André Gide and author of the novel, *Olivia*, while Pernal was Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge. The three youngest were strikingly “different.” Lytton as a pioneering writer, Marjorie never having much success with a failed love affair with an eminent married man and a tendency to dance in a bawdy way at parties, and James and his wife Alix as pioneers of psychoanalysis.

Caine has written an exemplary book that tells us how this significant family lived their lives. Lives of interest have been recovered. This book is an important addition to our understanding of British life in both its

domestic and imperial aspects, its changes and continuities.

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Identities: Time, Difference and Boundaries. By Heidrun Friese (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), xiv + 271 pp. \$75.00/£50.00 cloth; \$27.50/£18.50 paper.

The collection of papers, *Identities: Time, Difference and Boundaries*, edited by Heidrun Friese, is the first volume of the book-series “Making Sense of History.” The whole series is an attempt to reconsider, or initiate the reconsideration of the Western tradition of historical thinking and theorising. Major inadequacies of that tradition, recognised in the previous century, as suggested, are to be overcome by insisting on an interdisciplinarian and intercultural approach, and by focusing on the relationship between historical theory and procedures of historical memory. By doing so, it aims at contributing to mutual understanding, which the so far historical paradigm could not render fully.

The book is divided thematically into four chapters. The first, “Perspectives and Concepts,” defines various constructions of identity in academic discourse and proceeds to examine their implications. The insistence of formalised social sciences on the concepts of selfhood and identity, on personal and collective identity, is problematised to the point of inquiring after the current (im)possibility of their theorising. This part offers a subject-theoretical foundation of the concept of identity that allows not for complete discarding of the concept as known, but for a phenomenological philosophy that would incorporate contingency, difference and alterity of identity.

The second part of the book, “Representation and Translation,” opens up with the examination of the social studies epistemological assumptions about representation of others and of difference. Translation is examined as not reciprocal but an asymmetrical relationship of distanciation from the other. There is an argument in favour of the interactional concept of research in social

sciences that is to provide a polyvocal reconstruction of the concept of culture and translation, and thus allow different modes of discourse “to codetermine the ways of interpretation.”

The chapter on “Women and Alterity” examines the practice of representation of women. Drawing on concrete examples of hysteria, “an exemplary female state,” and the sedimented layers of meaning in the word “Jewess,” it aims to show and prove that the social practice of limiting and excluding not only relates to identity formation, but also to the defining of deviancy and femininity.

The book ends with “Boundaries and Ethnicity,” a chapter that examines ethnic and national concepts of identity as created through social practices of inclusion and exclusion. These are elaborated on the illustrative studies of multiethnic London, constitution of post-colonial African awareness of its identity, longevity of nationalism, and the persistence of fundamentalism.

The axis of the collection is the exploration of the variety of ways identity is constructed. There is an overwhelming argument that the crucial aspects of the phenomenon of identity are the opposition between the inside and outside, and temporality, that if understood as change, would allow for identity to be comprehended as a constant practice of difference, and not as an opposition to it. The contributions in the book, the papers of scholarly excellence, share the same sensibility, perhaps signalling the formation of a new basis of social theory in its broadest sense.

NADEŽDA STOJKOVIĆ
University of Niš, Serbia

A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq. Edited by Thomas Cushman (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), xii + 372 pp. \$55.00/\$21.95 paper.

This is an anthology of essays by liberal interventionists arguing in opposition to fellow *progressives* in (qualified) defense of the US invasion of Iraq. The contributors, mostly journalists and academics, are a geographically interesting group; from the professional gadfly,

Christopher Hitchens, to Jose Ramos-Horta and Adam Michnik. By my count, aside from Hitchens, who is difficult to classify by place, there are 15 European contributors (seven British), five Americans (US), a Canadian, an Australian, and Ramos-Horta from East Timor. The most significant omission, given the title and focus, is the Canadian Michael Ignatieff, whose personal angst about supporting the war has been chronicled in a series of excellent essays in the *New York Times Magazine* and an excellent extended essay (The Gifford Lectures) titled *The Lesser Evil* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

Thomas Cushman provides an excellent introductory essay, setting down seven questions that mark the contributions, generally concerning arguments in support of humanitarian (military) intervention. The essays, roughly parsed, involve the justification of military intervention on humanitarian grounds, as opposed to maintaining an unconditional respect for *legal* sovereignty, this combined with severe criticism of US unilateralism and equally severe criticism of the western European pacifist Left that, as a practical matter, seemed prepared to support the continued existence of the tyrannical Iraqi regime rather than applauding its awkward destruction. Of course, it yet remains to be seen if something better results for the Iraqis, a qualification well understood by some authors.

The authors are accomplished and responsible public commentators. The editor has divided the essays under headings of “Reconsidering Regime Change,” “Philosophical Arguments,” “Critiques of the Left,” “European Dimensions,” “Solidarity [with the weak],” and “Liberal Statesmanship”—the two essays by Tony Blair. The distinctions between sections seems largely cosmetic to one outside the internal arguments of the cosmopolitan left and there is a sameness to the arguments presented.

The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center turned the world on its head in a variety of ways. Most significant to the essays addressed here, it changed George W. Bush from a vocal opponent of overseas nation-building to the world’s leading practitioner of Wilsonianism. American neo-conservative policy pundits and government spokesmen hijacked the rhetoric recently used by liberals arguing for the several armed

interventions of the 1990s. Visceral opposition to Bush's unilateralism, and what is taken on the left for the disingenuousness—if not mendacity—of the administration's public case for the invasion of Iraq, continues to discredit the war in the eyes of many. How could one support an intervention so suspect in sponsorship and motivation, the authors' imagined opponents ask, even if it was ultimately progressive in result? These essays set about providing an answer. The fundamental argument is consequentialist: the Iraqi people are (or can be) better off as a result.

RICHARD M. SWAIN
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The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration.

By Glyn Morgan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), xii + 204 pp. \$29.95/£18.95 cloth.

This book, written by the political philosopher Glyn Morgan (Harvard University), is not a European study. For a European intellectual it offers a surprising insight into European integration. Although I personally believe that social rights are crucial for defending a welfare regime, apart from restoring and maintaining the European democratic heritage, this is not the message of this book. *The Idea of a European Superstate* is about the justification of the political integration of the European Union. It promotes a European Superstate to guarantee security: "A Europe dependent on others (e.g. the United States) for its military protection, unable to take autonomous action, unable to define its own friends and enemies, is, in the broader sense of the term, insecure" (161). The main argument is presented on the first page of the preface: "This book argues that there is much more to be said in favor of a unitary European State—a 'European superstate', as those editorial writers would call it—than most people recognize" (ix). A superstate implies the establishment of the United States of Europe, with 455 million inhabitants in 25 countries.

In the member states of the European Union, this is not a familiar argument. Many people prefer a federalist point of view,

but Morgan makes a distinction between two kinds of federalists: "Having clearly distinguished between two diametrically opposed meanings of the term 'federalism', it is possible to summarize the differences between federalists (who seek a 'unitary state' in Europe) and *federalists* (who seek a European federal polity). A European federalist seeks a Europe that locates the most important political functions at the European level of government, even if this requires considerable centralization of power in Brussels. A European *federalist*, in contrast, seeks to disperse power to multiple (different) centers and to the lowest, most decentralized levels possible" (14–15). In the European Union this is known as the subsidiarity principle, stemming from the political theory of the Christian Democrats.

It will be clear that Morgan is in favor of one unitary state, perhaps even including Turkey, which possibility to date is still very unclear. Without such a unity, Europe will remain dependent for its security on the United States of America. He makes, as quoted, a sharp distinction between a unitary state in Europe and a European federal polity. He follows two lines of reasoning—of Eurosceptics (especially in the UK) and of Europhiles. His argument is that Europeans must abandon national sovereignty in favor of European sovereignty to guarantee international security: "Perhaps a more probable, if more troubling, possibility for Europe's future political integration is that it will be crisis driven" (163). The main justification for a unitary state rests on an external enemy, such as terrorists.

Besides the preface, introduction and conclusion, *The Idea of a European Superstate* consists of seven chapters, dealing with justification, nationalism, Euroscepticism, welfare, security, a postsovereign Europe and a sovereign Europe. The idea that European integration will be mainly a matter of security, foreign affairs and defense is not a very European conception, although in the European Constitution one European minister of foreign affairs has been proposed. However, there is no consensus about this Constitution, and all 25 members must first agree with it. Nevertheless, for a European intellectual, it is informative to be confronted with this atypical argument. In my opinion, Jeremy Rifkin's *The European Dream* (2004) gives a better insight into what is going on in the

European Union. By the way, he too is an American (President of the Foundation of Economic Trends in Washington).

DOUWE VAN HOUTEN
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The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir. By Stipe Mesić (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 422 pp. £29.95 cloth; £15.95 paper.

Written by one of the few persons in the world who can boast of having served as president of two countries, this book is an important addition to the library of personal memoirs on the demise of Yugoslavia and the emergence of an independent Croatia. First published in 1992 in Croatian under the title *Kako smo srušili Jugoslaviju* [*How We Destroyed Yugoslavia*], this book by Stipe Mesić—the current president of Croatia—analyses the events and personalities that marked the demise of Yugoslavia from May to December 1991. The incorporation of excerpts from Mesić's own diary into the narrative underlines the central role that he played at this time: in May 1991 his scheduled assumption of the rotating Yugoslav presidency was blocked by Serbian representatives and their political allies from Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Mesić only became Yugoslav president in July 1991 after diplomatic intervention by the European Community, but in December he resigned from this post as the international recognition of Croatian independence increasingly became a reality, and he went on to serve as speaker of the Croatian parliament from 1992 to 1994.

Mesić's book begins with a prologue that details the formation, rise to power and political programme of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, to use its Croatian initials), the party that he helped to create from the late 1980s and which, under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman, led Croatia to independence and dominated its politics throughout the 1990s. The main part of Mesić's narrative then tracks the demise of Yugoslavia in 1991, from the blockade of his presidency and the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in June, through the war in Croatia and the diplomatic negotiations for an end to the

fighting, and up to the international moves towards the recognition of Croatia at the end of the year. Readers are guided through the elaborate account by summaries at the start of each chapter and a chronology of events at the end of the book, although for one who seeks information on specific events or personalities it is frustrating that there is no index.

Mesić's book is especially useful for illuminating the actions and motivations of Yugoslav leaders during the political crisis: he shows how Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and his supporters were unwilling to negotiate a reformed Yugoslavia and rejected Croatia's and Slovenia's proposals for a confederation, and also discusses the attempts made by the representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia to find a political solution that could prevent the country's bloody demise. Together with this focus on local personalities, *The Demise of Yugoslavia* also provides valuable insights into the policies and responses of international actors vis-à-vis the Yugoslav crisis. Mesić states that initially "the most important politicians in Europe and North America wanted only a unified Yugoslavia" (14), and that "the West was, unfortunately, slow to wake up" (406) to the Greater Serbian programme of the Milošević regime. The myth that Germany's support for Croatian and Slovenian independence precipitated the wars in the former Yugoslavia is also debunked by Mesić, who states that the Croatian side was "disturbed" that Germany's foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had agreed with his Soviet colleague in June 1991 that "the announced separations were not positive" (72). Indeed, Mesić shows that the country that most consistently supported Croatian and Slovenian aspirations for independence throughout 1991 was not Germany, but rather Austria.

Considering the brief—albeit for Croatia, tumultuous—time period that this book focuses on, there is little information in it on the development of Mesić's fascinating political career, although this lacuna could have been filled with an appropriate epilogue. The book was re-released in Croatian under the title *Kako je srušena Jugoslavija* [*How Yugoslavia Was Destroyed*] in 1994, the year when Mesić left the HDZ after he broke ranks with Tuđman over the latter's policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The publication of Mesić's memoirs in English was no doubt prompted by his surprising ascent to the Croatian presidency in 2000 after the death of his predecessor. Mesić's presidency has been marked by a commitment to improving the development of Croatia's liberal democracy and its relations with the international community, both of which were harmed by Tudjman's authoritarian and nationalist style of rule. In *The Demise of Yugoslavia*, though, Mesić and Tudjman are still intimately allied in the cause for Croatian independence, and some discussion on the subsequent and remarkable course of Mesić's career could have better connected the motivation behind the international publication of this book with its contents.

DEAN VULETIC
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Vitalising Nature in the Enlightenment.

By Peter Hanns Reill (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), ix + 388 pp. \$55.00 cloth.

Reviewing this book may seem at first a daunting task, but familiarity with it leads to an appreciation of Peter Reill's enormous amount of research and insight into very complex areas of knowledge; many subjects are involved, from biology to biography, all of which were embraced by the writers and philosophers of the eighteenth century. On almost every page there are familiar names, most of them complemented by notes. The book is divided into six chapters, with an introduction, a prologue, an epilogue, and extensive notes, bibliography and acknowledgments.

Most of the Prologue features the Humboldt Brothers, and the author tells us he is going to relate their work to the intellectual work of the late eighteenth century: "The task, then, is to understand the language of nature the Humboldts spoke and its larger implications" (30).

Chapter 1 discusses the implications of the mid-eighteenth-century writings of Buffon, Montesquieu and the *Encyclopédie*, which marked a new approach to nature and human

nature, knowledge and society. Buffon was a pioneer in this respect and left an indelible legacy particularly to the life sciences, chemistry and medicine. The following chapter is concerned mostly with chemistry, Hermann being mentioned as one of the few writers who took the subject seriously until later in the century, when a new language of nature was being formed, which had many elements in common with Buffon's. On familiar ground to many readers may be a reference to Kuhn's *Scientific Revolutions*. The chapter ends with Reill's view that: "Whatever the changes chemistry underwent in the late eighteenth century, they were not revolutionary in the broader sense of the word, but rather elaborations of a language whose first formation can be traced to the mid-century critique of mechanism" (118).

Reill begins chapter 3 by referring to a popular book by Pierre Roussel, and ends with a reference to Peter Simon Pallas, who was concerned with dual axes where the objects of study were located along the lines of which, "as Buffon had suggested, the repetitions and variations of form were located" (158).

The reader is alerted to the contents of the following chapter by its subtitle, namely, "Generation, Reproduction, and the Economy of Nature," offering an unusual perspective on the Enlightenment where the author states his intention of questioning the usual assumptions concerning its relationship with the origins of modernity. This he proceeds to do in the final chapter where he explains how, in his view, Romantic *Naturphilosophie* differs radically from Enlightenment Vitalism in dealing with different questions and different answers. Typical thinkers of the earlier period believed that knowledge was acquired through human experience and understanding, while later writers emphasized the importance of nature's unity.

The Epilogue contains a clear statement of Reill's conclusions. The entire book is a rewarding read for those who may enjoy viewing the Enlightenment from a fresh perspective.

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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Edited by Jean Khalifa (London: Continuum, 2003), x+211 pp. \$120.00/£154.57 cloth; \$37.95/£13.29 paper.

Jean Khalifa argues in the introduction to the present volume that for the generation of thinkers who came on the French intellectual scene in the years immediately following the Second World War, philosophy appeared to have arrived at an impasse. While the human sciences “presented themselves as a type of knowledge which would make philosophy redundant,” academic philosophy as such was dominated by a “highly scholarly but purely historical discourse” that effectively “relegated [philosophy] to the museum” (1). The task facing Gilles Deleuze and his generation was therefore to restore to philosophy its role in culture as a form of “creative thought” (1). As Deleuze himself suggests in his early study of David Hume, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1953), philosophy must “constitute itself as the theory of what we are doing, not as a theory of what there is” (3). Throughout his career, Deleuze affirmed this promotion of speculative creativity as central to philosophic practice. Thus, near the beginning of his final collaboration with Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, the question posed by the book’s title is answered with this statement: philosophy is “the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” [*What Is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 2].

For Deleuze, conceptual invention must constantly be renewed because thought “can only *encounter*” the chaotic multiplicity of reality whose ceaseless permutations “can take an infinity of forms” (32, 39). He will therefore seek to facilitate a capacity for invention by reformulating “the problems we usually end up solving by means of a transcendence . . . without recourse to an interiority, a beyond, a totality, an end or a meaning” (6) that would prescribe in advance the trajectory of philosophic thought. Deleuze thus proposes that philosophy may remain conceptually creative to the extent that the “plane of immanence” a given philosophy projects as the condition of possibility for its articulation succeeds in orienting the articulation of the philosophy without preordaining the outcome of philosophical thought on any given

occasion. The plane of immanence “by which the philosopher decides, pre-philosophically, what is worthy of thought” (26) is therefore not a doctrine that might be stated in propositional form but a “field” of potentiality whose “virtual” character enables inventive encounters with the endlessly differentiating turbulence of life, “the infinite into which thought plunges” (14).

In sum, the essays collected in this volume, written by a distinguished company of philosophers and literary intellectuals from across Europe and the Americas, provide a useful introductory overview of many of the key concepts and topics (for instance, “territory” and “deterritorialization,” “faciality,” “the refrain”) that collectively comprise Deleuze’s multifarious philosophy of becoming. Along the way, they instructively affiliate Deleuze both with a series of philosophers whose respective standpoints resonate with his own outlook (including, in particular, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Foucault) and with diverse figures in the arts (Herman Melville, Franz Kafka, Virginia Woolf, Francis Bacon), for whose respective projects he felt a particular affinity. Deleuze’s last published work—a brief but very suggestive statement on the concept of “immanence”—is also included with an explication by Giorgio Agamben, who perhaps can be said to speak for all when he observes that Deleuzian thought aspires to a form of knowledge that “has as its correlate no longer the opening to a world and to truth, but only life and its errancy” (152).

ERIC WHITE
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Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World. By Randall Styers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), vii+290 pp. \$85.00/£52.00 cloth; \$27.50/£16.00 paper.

In this thoughtful and thorough review of the role of magic in the making of Western Modernity, Randall Styers analyzes the ambiguous place magic has in the Western imagination. The book provides an exhaustive

overview of the many philosophers, historians, and social theorists who have attempted to define, categorize and delimit the meaning and place of magic in Western society. One is left both impressed and overwhelmed by the numerous authors cited and varying interpretations of magic presented in this book. One of Styers's clear goals is to articulate the numerous and incessant efforts at coming to grips with the meaning of magic and its role in the West. He does this well by not only exploring so many authors and different conceptions of magic but by placing them in a coherent framework.

The book begins by exploring the origins of magic in the West. Here Styers explores how magic came to be contrasted with the forces of science and reason emanating from the Enlightenment and Post-Reformation. While exploring the persecution of witches in the late medieval times, Styers does not provide a historical chronology but rather exposes this effort as part of a larger process of marginalizing magic. This process may have begun centuries ago, but as Styers highlights in the latter part of the book, it continues in contemporary Western thought. His work focuses extensively on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers, but he also includes work by post-colonial theorists like Edward Said.

This book pays special attention to the relationship of religion and magic as well as the nexus between magic and science. Myers correctly identifies the process of how Christianity, both in its Catholic and Protestant forms, became much more focused on rationality in the early modern period and sought to separate itself from forces that were considered magical. Nevertheless, numerous theorists have argued that religion has had difficulty disassociating itself from magic. Some modern theorists came to condemn or marginalize religion as they saw it in opposition to the scientific method. Styers presents evidence that magic has been conceived as similar to science in that it focused on means to control nature, but most of the evidence he presents illustrates how modernity's emphasis on science has tended to marginalize magic.

Styers devotes the last chapter of the book to explaining how secular forces in the past century have sought to marginalize magic in Western society because it served as an obstacle for the development of the rational, scientific,

and capitalist epoch. In his conclusion he suggests that perhaps the lack of imagination associated with the modern impersonal West of the twenty-first century necessitates the re-emergence of the magical world that might provide some meaning beyond the narrow scientific reasoned truth that dominates Western thought. While clearly not the last word on the role of magic in Western thought, this book provides an extremely useful and effective summary of its relationship to modernity.

TIMOTHY J. WHITE
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Mixed Messages: Materiality, Textuality, Missions. Edited by Jamie S. Scott and Gareth Griffiths (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xiii + 268 pp. \$65.00/£50.00 cloth; \$22.95/£16.99 paper.

This book is an edited collection of papers on various aspects of missionary activity. The chapters reflect the disparate interests and approaches of the authors. While missionary activity in its most encompassing definition may incorporate what is included, the contributors do not share a common scholarly perspective and thus the book as a whole is somewhat incoherent, typical of many edited collections.

The first chapter is perhaps the best in the book. Jeffrey Cox offers a very cogent review and analysis of the four master narratives of missionary scholarship. The secularization master narrative emphasizes how marginalized religious belief becomes in modern societies. The providentialist master narrative focuses on missionary activity from the perspective of those who were Western missionaries. The imperialist master narrative links missionary activity to the larger process of Western imperialism and efforts to gain political ascendancy in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and in the Pacific Islands. Finally, the postcolonial narrative builds upon the work of Edward Said and focuses on the perceptions of the missionary process by those who were colonized.

The second through seventh chapters of this book provide numerous and differing ways in which one can comprehend the

activities of Western missionaries as they related to the writing of texts, dress culture, popular writing, and educational processes. These chapters examine missionaries in South Africa, South India, the South Pacific, and Canada. Most of these chapters reflect the tendency to interpret missionary activity as the process of Western Christian missionaries preaching in historically pagan lands.

Chapters eight through ten explain the reverse process of missionary activity. They summarize and explicate the effort to spread Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism in the West, especially in the United States. These chapters provide comprehensive and thoughtful analyses of this process of counterpenetration, as religions that were threatened by the earlier efforts of Western missionaries now seek to gain favor in Western countries but with very different missionary appeals and proselytizing practices.

The ninth chapter of the book, written by J. Marshall Beier, offers an interesting analysis of missionary activity by utilizing modern International Relations (IR) theory. While Beier summarizes both Western missionary activity and IR theory well, he does not do as much as he might to explain the historical process of missionary activity. Instead, Beier cites the recent triumph of liberalism over realism in the IR literature to suggest that missionary activity is part of a larger Western effort of promoting a liberal identity.

Peter van der Veer in the conclusion of this volume offers a brief but intriguing analysis regarding the relationship of missionary activity, secularization, and the reimagining of traditions. Van der Veer is correct in identifying the constant mutation of religious forms and practices that result from the growing interaction of traditional religions with new and different traditions, as well as from the reality of secularization that has accompanied modernity. He contends that as religions change they are not disappearing as some secularization scholars and modernists expected. Instead, religion persists in the reimagined space of those who live and practice it. Overall, scholars of missionary activity will find this a useful and thoughtful addition to the literature.

TIMOTHY J. WHITE
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The Revolutions in Europe, 1848–1849: From Reform to Reaction. Edited by R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), xi + 250 pp. £15.99 paper.

The contributions to this volume began as lectures given in Oxford to commemorate the sesquicentennial of the 1848 revolutions in Europe. Addressing the four main settings for upheaval—France, Italy, Germany, and the Habsburg lands—as well as reactions to this upheaval in Russia, Britain, and the United States, these remarkably concise and interdisciplinary essays offer a wide-ranging analysis of the causes, broken courses, and long-term consequences of the 1848–49 revolutions. The collection lends the study of these revolutions greater complexity by insisting on the multi-dimensional character of events and greater depth by elaborating long-term outcomes that continue to shape the appropriation of these revolutions in collective memory.

These scrupulously edited essays are methodologically coherent. Resisting the reductionism that has plagued the analysis of the revolutions since they occurred, the authors approach their topics with a broader, “total” compass of vision, and they organize the findings of political, social, cultural, and regional history. R. J. W. Evans’s essay on revolutionary causation, for example, demonstrates that the liberalism and nationalism of disparate elites could nevertheless combine in an “inflammatory mix” (14), while the social anxieties of the poor could be “channelled towards cultural and political goals” to produce “modern urban riot” (17–18). In a similar way, Geoffrey Ellis’s contribution on France appreciates the political angst of the liberal and republican urban bourgeoisie, which gave impetus to demands for universal manhood suffrage. It argues, however, that more critical to the revolution’s *dénouement* was the involvement of small-scale peasant proprietors, whose economic conservatism feared an aggressive policy of land distribution under the Provisional Government. The ferociously repressed victims of the “June Days” could also thank the thousands of petty landowners from provincial France, who hastened to the capitol “by train to play their part in what they saw as the defence of the propertied order” (43). The multiple triggers of revolutionary

turbulence certainly figured in Italy, observes Denis Mack Smith. Here an “untidy and illogical” (57) political map and gulfs of social divergence prevented any coordinated revolutionary effort, which might be led by republicans, rural farmers, even Sicilian *mafiosi* in lurking search of vendetta justice. Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann’s sophisticated interpretation of the “revolution of idealists” (117) in Germany stresses an initial community of interests between political reformers and social protesters that could not hold up against stubborn regional particularism and the regrouped army of the Prussian king. And R. J. W. Evans’s discussion of the rapidly shifting events in Habsburg lands considers politics, society, and culture, not least in his section on Czech ambitions which, when asserted by the historian Franz Palacký in 1848, marked “the moment when the ethnic worm turned in central Europe” (189).

The basic argument of the volume emerges successively in these case studies as well as in a succinct opening essay by von Strandmann. It is that even if the *anciens régimes* collapsed only temporarily, the revolutions of 1848–49 were not failures, because they realized achievements of lasting significance. These included male suffrage and an enduring republicanism, albeit chastened, in France, the coalescence of national consciousness in Italy, the origins of party politics and

constitutionalism in Germany, national rights in Austria, and the abolition of feudal rule in the countryside, especially in the Habsburg Empire. The impact of the revolutions reverberated further. David Saunders suggests that Tsar Nicholas I’s interventionism won but a Pyrrhic victory, since the policy widened a divide “pregnant with dangerous implications for the future” (141) between Russia and the rest of the Continent. Leslie Mitchell, Timothy Roberts, and Daniel Howe show how the revolutions were major events in shaping Anglo–American exceptionalism. Elites in both Britain and the United States interpreted them with a smug sense of separateness and an inflated awareness of political maturity that galled desperate fighters like Louis Kossuth. The effort to discover a “usable” interpretation of the revolutions is the explicit focus of a splendid concluding essay by Robert Gildea. Up to the present day democrats, socialists, nationalists, and slave emancipationists invoke memories of the revolutions that blend history and myth in the creation of constituent identities. There is no better argument for the lasting repercussions of the 1848–49 revolutions, which this impressive volume explains in engaging fashion.

JEFFREY T. ZALAR
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